by Ezra Klein
Ezra Klein. “We are a collection of functional parts whose efforts combine into a dysfunctional whole.”
“A thoughtful, clear and persuasive analysis” (The New York Times Book Review), Why We’re Polarized reveals the structural and psychological forces behind America’s descent into division and dysfunction. Neither a polemic nor a lament, this book offers a clear framework for understanding everything from Trump’s rise to the Democratic Party’s leftward shift to the politicization of everyday culture.
America is polarized, first and foremost, by identity. Everyone engaged in
American politics is engaged, at some level, in identity politics. Over the
past fifty years in America, our partisan identities have merged with our
racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities. These
merged identities have attained a weight that is breaking much in our
politics and tearing at the bonds that hold this country together. -
Amazon
Table of Contents
Introduction; What Didn't Happen.
In the introduction of "Why We're Polarized" by Ezra Klein, titled "What Didn't Happen," the author sets the stage for the book by addressing common misconceptions and theories about the causes of political polarization in the United States. Klein provides an overview of the central thesis and framework that will be explored in the subsequent chapters.
Klein begins by dispelling the notion that polarization is solely a result of extreme partisanship or the actions of individual politicians. He argues that polarization is a systemic problem deeply rooted in the structure of American politics, rather than being caused by a few outliers or radical actors.
The chapter then delves into the historical context of polarization, highlighting key moments and developments that have shaped the current landscape. Klein explores the impact of events such as the Civil Rights Movement, the rise of conservative media, and the erosion of political norms. He challenges the idea that polarization is a recent phenomenon, instead tracing its roots back several decades.
Klein discusses the role of social and cultural changes in driving polarization. He examines how shifting demographics, technological advancements, and the changing media landscape have influenced political identities and deepened partisan divisions. He emphasizes that polarization is not solely a result of changing attitudes but is also driven by structural and systemic factors.
The author also addresses the concept of tribalism and how it contributes to polarization. He explores how humans have a natural inclination to form group identities and the ways in which political parties have become powerful identity markers. He argues that polarization is not solely about policy disagreements but is increasingly driven by identity-based divisions.
Klein concludes the introduction by outlining the central theme of the book: the idea that polarization is a predictable consequence of the American political system's design. He emphasizes the need to understand the underlying factors and dynamics that perpetuate polarization in order to address and mitigate its effects.
Overall, the introduction of "Why We're Polarized" provides an overview of the book's central arguments and framework. Klein challenges common misconceptions about the causes of polarization, highlighting the systemic nature of the problem. By setting the stage for the subsequent chapters, he invites readers to delve deeper into the complexities of political polarization and offers a roadmap for understanding and addressing this pressing issue.
Chapter 1: How Democrats Became Liberals, Republicans Conservatives
In the opening chapter the author delves into the historical transformation of the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States. Klein explores the evolution of these parties, highlighting how they have become increasingly ideologically divided over the years.
Klein starts by tracing the origins of the Democratic Party, which was initially formed as a coalition of various groups with different priorities. During the New Deal era, Democrats began to embrace a more liberal agenda, advocating for social welfare programs, workers' rights, and civil rights. This shift was largely driven by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies and the party's response to the Great Depression.
On the other hand, Klein examines the Republican Party's transformation into a conservative powerhouse. He explains how the Republican Party, traditionally associated with progressive ideals, underwent a significant shift in the 1960s. The party began to align itself with conservative values, such as limited government intervention, free-market capitalism, and traditional social values. This shift was exemplified by the nomination of Barry Goldwater as the Republican presidential candidate in 1964.
Klein then delves into the impact of racial and cultural issues on the partisan divide. He discusses how the Democratic Party's support for civil rights during the 1960s led to a realignment, as conservative white voters, primarily in the South, began to shift their allegiance to the Republican Party. This realignment solidified the racial and cultural divisions between the two parties, contributing to the polarization we see today.
The chapter also addresses the role of media and political elites in reinforcing partisan identities. Klein explains how media outlets and political elites increasingly cater to specific partisan audiences, promoting narratives and perspectives that align with their respective ideologies. This trend has further entrenched the polarization and made it more difficult for voters to find common ground.
To conclude the chapter, Klein emphasizes that the transformation of the Democratic and Republican parties into liberal and conservative powerhouses was not inevitable but rather the result of historical contingencies and strategic decisions. He sets the stage for the subsequent chapters, where he will explore how these divisions have shaped contemporary American politics and the challenges they pose for effective governance.
Overall, Chapter 1 of "Why We're Polarized" provides an insightful historical overview of how the Democratic and Republican parties have evolved into liberal and conservative entities, respectively. Klein's analysis sheds light on the origins of the current political landscape and sets the foundation for understanding the polarization that defines American politics today.
Chapter 2: The Dixiecrat Dilemma.
In Chapter 2 the author explores the deep-rooted racial and regional divisions within the Democratic Party, particularly in the context of the southern states. Klein delves into the historical background of the Democratic Party's association with segregation and racism, as well as the complex dynamics that have shaped the party's evolution.
Klein begins by discussing the Democratic Party's historical reliance on the southern states and the challenges it faced in balancing its support for civil rights with the desires of southern white voters who opposed racial integration. He highlights the tension faced by Democratic leaders who were torn between their commitment to progressivism and their need to maintain electoral support from the South.
The chapter then delves into the pivotal 1948 presidential election, which witnessed a significant rupture within the Democratic Party. At that time, a group of southern Democrats, known as the Dixiecrats, formed their own political party in protest against the Democratic Party's embrace of civil rights. Led by Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrats nominated their own candidate and advocated for racial segregation.
Klein explores how the Dixiecrat rebellion during the 1948 election highlighted the deep racial divisions within the Democratic Party. While President Harry Truman's endorsement of civil rights helped set the stage for future advancements in racial equality, it also caused many southern white Democrats to defect to the Republican Party, which presented itself as more aligned with their conservative values.
The author then analyzes the long-term consequences of the Dixiecrat dilemma on American politics. He explains how the defection of southern white voters to the Republican Party marked the beginning of a significant realignment that would reshape the political landscape. The Republican Party, once associated with progressive policies and civil rights, gradually transformed into a party appealing to conservative white voters, particularly in the South.
Klein also highlights the impact of race and racial resentment on partisan polarization. He argues that the unresolved racial divisions from the past continue to influence contemporary politics, with issues such as affirmative action and immigration serving as lightning rods for partisan conflict.
In conclusion, Chapter 2 of "Why We're Polarized" sheds light on the complex dynamics surrounding the Democratic Party's struggle to navigate the racial and regional divides within its ranks. The Dixiecrat rebellion and the subsequent realignment of southern white voters to the Republican Party played a significant role in shaping the current partisan polarization in American politics. Klein's analysis offers valuable insights into the historical factors that have contributed to the deepening divide between the two major parties.
Chapter 3: Your Brain on Groups.
In Chapter 3 the author explores the psychological and cognitive processes that contribute to the formation and intensification of political polarization. Klein delves into the human inclination to identify with groups, the biases that arise from this affiliation, and how these dynamics impact political behavior.
Klein begins by discussing the psychological concept of group identity and its powerful influence on individuals. He explains how humans are hardwired to seek out and connect with others who share similar beliefs, values, and identities. This natural tendency towards tribalism can lead to the formation of strong group attachments and a sense of "us versus them."
The chapter then delves into the phenomenon of in-group bias, which is the tendency for individuals to favor members of their own group over outsiders. Klein explains how this bias shapes our perceptions and judgments, leading to a heightened sense of loyalty and solidarity with our own political tribe. In turn, this bias can contribute to the demonization and dehumanization of those outside our group, further fueling political polarization.
Klein also examines the concept of confirmation bias, which refers to the tendency to seek out information that confirms our existing beliefs while disregarding or dismissing evidence that challenges them. He explains how confirmation bias reinforces and amplifies our preexisting beliefs, making it difficult for us to engage with differing perspectives or consider alternative viewpoints.
The chapter further explores the role of emotions in shaping political attitudes and behavior. Klein discusses how emotions, such as fear, anger, and moral outrage, can be manipulated and exploited by political leaders and media outlets to deepen partisan divisions. He highlights the power of emotional appeals in activating group identities and mobilizing supporters.
Klein concludes the chapter by emphasizing that understanding these cognitive and psychological biases is crucial for comprehending the roots of political polarization. He argues that acknowledging these inherent tendencies can help us become more aware of our own biases and develop strategies to bridge the divide between political tribes.
Overall, Chapter 3 of "Why We're Polarized" provides an insightful exploration of the psychological mechanisms that underlie group identity and contribute to political polarization. Klein's analysis of in-group bias, confirmation bias, and the role of emotions offers a comprehensive understanding of why people gravitate towards their political tribes and why bridging the partisan divide is often challenging.
Chapter 4: The Press Secretary in Your Mind.
In Chapter 4 the author explores the role of the media in shaping political beliefs and perpetuating partisan polarization. Klein delves into the biases, incentives, and structural factors within the media landscape that contribute to the widening divide between political tribes.
Klein begins by discussing the historical evolution of the media landscape in the United States. He highlights the transformation from a relatively unbiased and objective news reporting approach to a more fragmented and partisan media environment. He explores how technological advancements, the rise of cable news, and the advent of social media have contributed to the proliferation of partisan echo chambers.
The chapter then delves into the concept of media bias and how it intersects with audience preferences. Klein explains how media outlets, in their quest for higher ratings and increased revenue, cater to their target audiences by providing content that reinforces their existing beliefs and values. This selective exposure to like-minded information further entrenches partisan identities and exacerbates polarization.
Klein also explores the phenomenon of "motivated reasoning" and its influence on media consumption. Motivated reasoning refers to the tendency of individuals to selectively interpret and evaluate information in a way that aligns with their preexisting beliefs. This cognitive bias leads people to seek out and trust sources that confirm their worldview while dismissing or distrusting conflicting information.
The author then analyzes the impact of social media and the proliferation of misinformation on political polarization. He explains how the algorithms and echo chambers of social media platforms create an environment where individuals are exposed to increasingly extreme and polarizing content. This amplification of partisan narratives and the spread of misinformation contribute to the widening ideological gap between political tribes.
Klein concludes the chapter by discussing the implications of media polarization on political discourse and public opinion. He emphasizes the need for media literacy, critical thinking, and a diverse media diet to counteract the negative effects of partisan media. He also calls for a reassessment of the media's role in society and the potential for reforms that promote more balanced and objective reporting.
Overall, Chapter 4 of "Why We're Polarized" offers a comprehensive analysis of the media's influence on political polarization. Klein highlights the ways in which media bias, selective exposure, motivated reasoning, and social media dynamics contribute to the deepening divide between political tribes. By examining these factors, he encourages readers to be more discerning consumers of news and advocates for a more balanced and responsible media ecosystem.
Chapter 5: Demographic Threat.
In Chapter 5 the author explores how demographic changes and shifting racial dynamics in the United States contribute to political polarization. Klein delves into the anxieties, fears, and political strategies that arise as the country becomes more diverse, and how these dynamics shape the behavior of both Democrats and Republicans.
Klein begins by examining the concept of demographic change and its impact on political attitudes. He explains how the growing racial and ethnic diversity in America can trigger a sense of threat among certain groups, particularly white Americans who fear losing their majority status. This demographic anxiety often manifests as a strong identification with one's racial or ethnic group and can contribute to increased polarization.
The chapter then delves into the political strategies employed by both Democrats and Republicans in response to demographic changes. Klein explores how Democrats, in their quest for a diverse and inclusive coalition, have embraced policies and rhetoric that prioritize issues of racial justice and social equality. On the other hand, he examines how Republicans, in an attempt to maintain their support among white voters, have employed strategies that stoke fears about immigration, cultural change, and the erosion of traditional values.
Klein also addresses the role of identity politics in exacerbating polarization. He explains how identity-based appeals and the emphasis on group interests can further deepen divisions and hinder cross-group cooperation. The increasing focus on racial, ethnic, and cultural identities in political discourse can lead to a zero-sum mentality, where gains for one group are seen as losses for another, intensifying polarization.
The author further explores the implications of demographic threat on the political landscape. He discusses how political polarization is not solely driven by ideological differences but also by the dynamics of identity and group affiliations. These dynamics shape voters' perceptions, choices, and partisan alignments, contributing to the widening divide between Democrats and Republicans.
Klein concludes the chapter by acknowledging the complexities and challenges posed by demographic changes. He encourages a more nuanced understanding of demographic shifts, calling for empathy, dialogue, and efforts to bridge racial and ethnic divides. He emphasizes the need for policies that address the concerns of all Americans and foster a sense of shared identity and common purpose.
Overall, Chapter 5 of "Why We're Polarized" provides a thought-provoking analysis of how demographic changes and the perception of demographic threat contribute to political polarization. Klein's examination of the anxieties, strategies, and identity dynamics at play offers insights into the deepening divide between Democrats and Republicans. By understanding these factors, he urges readers to seek common ground and build a more inclusive and cohesive society.
Chapter 6: The Media Divide Beyond Left-Right.
In Chapter 6 the author explores how the media landscape goes beyond simple left-right divisions and how different media ecosystems contribute to political polarization. Klein delves into the various media subcultures and the consequences of consuming news from ideologically aligned sources.
Klein begins by discussing the fragmentation of the media landscape into distinct subcultures. He explains how individuals today have the ability to curate their own media diet, selecting sources that align with their ideological preferences and beliefs. This fragmentation leads to the formation of separate media ecosystems, each reinforcing and amplifying specific narratives, values, and ideologies.
The chapter then delves into the consequences of consuming news from ideologically aligned sources. Klein explores how these echo chambers contribute to partisan polarization by exacerbating biases, reinforcing preexisting beliefs, and undermining trust in alternative viewpoints. He discusses the concept of epistemic closure, where individuals become insulated within their own media bubbles and are less exposed to diverse perspectives.
Klein further examines the impact of social media algorithms and filter bubbles on media consumption and polarization. He explains how these algorithms personalize content, prioritizing information that aligns with users' previous engagement and interests. This personalized content can create echo chambers that reinforce existing beliefs and limit exposure to differing viewpoints, further entrenching partisan identities.
The author also discusses the role of media gatekeepers and the rise of alternative media sources. He explores how social media platforms and online publications have disrupted traditional media gatekeeping structures, allowing for the spread of misinformation and the rise of partisan outlets that cater to specific ideological niches. These alternative sources often prioritize sensationalism and confirmation bias, deepening polarization.
Klein concludes the chapter by emphasizing the importance of media literacy and cross-cutting exposure. He argues that media literacy skills are crucial for navigating the complex media landscape, evaluating sources critically, and understanding the biases and incentives at play. He also advocates for seeking out diverse perspectives, engaging with differing viewpoints, and cultivating a more nuanced understanding of complex issues.
Overall, Chapter 6 of "Why We're Polarized" provides a comprehensive examination of the media divide beyond simple left-right distinctions. Klein's analysis of media subcultures, echo chambers, and the impact of social media algorithms sheds light on how media consumption habits contribute to political polarization. By highlighting the consequences of consuming news from ideologically aligned sources, he encourages readers to actively seek out diverse perspectives and engage with a range of viewpoints for a more informed and balanced understanding of complex issues.
Chapter 7: Post-Persuasion Elections.
In Chapter 7 the author explores the changing nature of political campaigns and elections in the context of deepening polarization. Klein delves into the shift from persuasion-based campaigns to mobilization-focused strategies and how this shift contributes to the polarization of American politics.
Klein begins by discussing the traditional model of political campaigns, which emphasized persuading undecided voters and appealing to a broad base of support. He explains how this model relied on candidates presenting themselves as moderate and seeking to appeal to voters across the ideological spectrum. However, he argues that this model has become less effective in the current polarized environment.
The chapter then delves into the rise of mobilization-focused strategies, where campaigns prioritize energizing and turning out their base of supporters rather than persuading undecided voters. Klein explains how this shift is driven by the recognition that polarization has made the pool of persuadable voters smaller, and the focus has shifted towards motivating one's own supporters to show up on Election Day.
Klein explores the role of political parties, interest groups, and grassroots organizations in driving this mobilization-focused approach. He discusses how these entities prioritize engaging their base, emphasizing core issues, and using emotional appeals to motivate supporters. This approach can lead to increased polarization, as campaigns become more focused on activating and energizing partisan identities rather than seeking common ground.
The chapter further examines the implications of this shift on policy-making and governance. Klein argues that the focus on mobilization can hinder the ability of elected officials to pursue compromise and bipartisan solutions, as catering to the party base becomes a priority. This can contribute to gridlock and the inability to address pressing issues in a collaborative manner.
Klein concludes the chapter by highlighting the challenges and potential solutions in the era of post-persuasion elections. He calls for a reevaluation of campaign strategies and a renewed focus on building coalitions and finding common ground. He also emphasizes the need for electoral reforms that encourage greater participation, reduce polarization, and promote representation of diverse viewpoints.
Overall, Chapter 7 of "Why We're Polarized" offers a compelling analysis of the transformation of political campaigns and elections in the face of increasing polarization. Klein's exploration of the shift from persuasion-based to mobilization-focused strategies provides insights into how this shift contributes to the deepening divide between political tribes. By recognizing the implications of this shift, he encourages readers to consider alternative approaches that promote greater inclusivity, collaboration, and compromise in the political sphere.
Chapter 8: Why Bipartisanship Becomes Irrational.
In Chapter 8 the author explores the factors that contribute to the breakdown of bipartisan cooperation in American politics. Klein delves into the psychological, structural, and strategic reasons that make pursuing bipartisanship increasingly challenging in the current polarized climate.
Klein begins by discussing the psychological biases that hinder bipartisanship. He explores the concept of affective polarization, which refers to the deep-seated animosity and negative feelings that individuals from opposing parties hold towards one another. He explains how this affective polarization can lead to a lack of trust, mutual disdain, and a reluctance to engage in meaningful bipartisan collaboration.
The chapter then delves into the structural factors that impede bipartisanship. Klein discusses the rise of ideologically homogeneous districts and the role of gerrymandering in creating safe seats for incumbents. These factors incentivize politicians to appeal to their party's base rather than seek compromise with the other side. He also examines the influence of interest groups, party leadership, and media dynamics, which often prioritize ideological purity over bipartisanship.
Klein further explores the strategic reasons why bipartisanship becomes irrational. He discusses how pursuing bipartisan solutions can be perceived as a political liability, as compromising with the other side may be seen as betraying one's own party and alienating the base. This creates a "prisoner's dilemma" situation, where politicians fear being punished by their own party if they engage in bipartisan efforts.
The chapter also addresses the consequences of the breakdown of bipartisanship on governance. Klein highlights how the inability to reach bipartisan agreements leads to policy gridlock, inefficient governance, and the exacerbation of existing societal challenges. He argues that the pursuit of ideological victories at the expense of compromise ultimately undermines the ability to address pressing issues effectively.
Klein concludes the chapter by discussing potential solutions to reinvigorate bipartisanship. He emphasizes the importance of building trust, fostering a culture of cooperation, and incentivizing politicians to seek common ground. He also explores the role of electoral and institutional reforms, such as ranked-choice voting and campaign finance reform, in promoting more inclusive and collaborative politics.
Overall, Chapter 8 of "Why We're Polarized" provides a comprehensive analysis of the reasons why bipartisanship becomes increasingly irrational in contemporary American politics. Klein's exploration of psychological biases, structural factors, and strategic considerations sheds light on the challenges faced in fostering cooperation between Democrats and Republicans. By addressing these factors and proposing potential solutions, he encourages readers to reevaluate the value of bipartisanship and seek avenues for constructive collaboration in the political arena.
Chapter 9: The Difference Between Democrats and Republicans.
In Chapter 9 the author explores the ideological and cultural distinctions that define the two major political parties in the United States. Klein delves into the historical context, policy positions, and cultural values that differentiate Democrats and Republicans, contributing to the deepening polarization between the two groups.
Klein begins by discussing the historical evolution of the Democratic and Republican parties. He explores how these parties have undergone significant ideological shifts over time, driven by changing demographics, cultural shifts, and political realignments. He highlights key moments and policy positions that have shaped the parties' identities and voter bases.
The chapter then delves into the policy differences between Democrats and Republicans. Klein explores how the parties diverge on a range of issues, including healthcare, taxes, immigration, climate change, and social issues. He discusses how these policy differences reflect distinct underlying values, priorities, and visions for the role of government in society.
Klein also examines the cultural and demographic differences that exist between Democrats and Republicans. He explores how these differences, such as race, education, and geography, contribute to the formation of distinct partisan identities. He highlights how these cultural and demographic factors intersect with policy positions, shaping the parties' platforms and electoral strategies.
The author further explores how these differences between Democrats and Republicans contribute to the deepening polarization in American politics. He discusses how partisan identities become intertwined with personal identities, leading to an "us versus them" mentality and a reluctance to engage with opposing viewpoints. He also addresses how cultural and policy differences can exacerbate tribalism, reinforcing partisan identities and entrenching polarization.
Klein concludes the chapter by acknowledging the complexities and nuances within each party. He emphasizes the importance of recognizing the diversity of viewpoints and interests within the Democratic and Republican parties, cautioning against oversimplification or generalization. He encourages readers to seek a deeper understanding of the policy positions and cultural values that define each party, fostering empathy and constructive dialogue.
Overall, Chapter 9 of "Why We're Polarized" provides a comprehensive analysis of the ideological, policy, and cultural differences that distinguish Democrats and Republicans. Klein's exploration of the historical context, policy positions, and cultural factors offers insights into the deepening divide between the two parties. By understanding these differences, he encourages readers to engage in nuanced discussions and bridge the gap between Democrats and Republicans for the betterment of the political discourse and the country as a whole.
Chapter 10: Managing Polarization--and ourselves.
In Chapter 10 the author explores strategies for navigating and mitigating the harmful effects of polarization on both an individual and societal level. Klein delves into the importance of self-awareness, empathy, institutional reforms, and collective action in managing and potentially reducing polarization.
Klein begins by discussing the role of self-awareness in understanding one's own biases and the ways in which polarization may shape one's thinking and behavior. He encourages readers to engage in introspection, challenging their own assumptions, and critically evaluating their sources of information. By recognizing the influence of polarization on personal perspectives, individuals can take steps to broaden their understanding and foster open-mindedness.
The chapter then delves into the significance of empathy and understanding in managing polarization. Klein emphasizes the importance of empathizing with individuals who hold different viewpoints, seeking to understand their values and concerns. He highlights the power of genuine dialogue, respectful engagement, and finding common ground as means to bridge divides and reduce animosity.
Klein explores the role of institutions and systemic reforms in managing polarization. He discusses the influence of political party structures, campaign finance laws, and media regulations on exacerbating or mitigating polarization. He argues for the need to address structural factors that incentivize extreme partisanship and hinder collaboration, proposing potential reforms that prioritize inclusive representation, reduce the influence of money in politics, and promote more balanced media ecosystems.
The chapter further examines the importance of collective action in managing polarization. Klein discusses the role of grassroots movements, community organizations, and civic engagement in fostering dialogue, mobilizing for change, and promoting collaboration across partisan lines. He emphasizes the power of collective efforts in reshaping the political landscape and driving meaningful reforms.
Klein concludes the chapter by acknowledging the challenges and complexities of managing polarization. He emphasizes that reducing polarization requires a multifaceted approach that combines personal reflection, empathetic dialogue, institutional reforms, and collective action. While polarization may not be entirely eliminated, he argues that managing its negative effects is crucial for a more functional and inclusive democracy.
Overall, Chapter 10 of "Why We're Polarized" provides a comprehensive exploration of strategies for managing polarization at an individual and societal level. Klein's discussion of self-awareness, empathy, institutional reforms, and collective action offers practical insights for readers seeking to navigate the challenges posed by polarization. By highlighting the potential for personal and collective agency, he encourages readers to take active steps towards fostering understanding, promoting collaboration, and working towards a more cohesive and productive political landscape.
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Dixiecrats Switch from Democrat to Republican
Did you know that seventy years ago, our grandparents were having an underpolarization crisis? True! In 1950, the American Political Science Association "released a call to arms...pleading for a more polarized political system". The report argued that "the parties contain too much diversity of opinion and work together too easily, leaving voters confused about who to vote for and why". Everyone agreed with each other so much, and compromised so readily, that supporting one party over the other seemed almost pointless.
In 1976, three years after Roe v. Wade, Democrats and Republicans were about equally likely to support abortion restrictions. That same year, a poll found that "only 54% of the electorate believed that the Republican Party was more conservative than the Democratic Party"; 30% thought there was no difference. As late as 2004, about equal numbers (within 5 pp) of Democrats and Republicans agreed with statements like "government is almost always wasteful and inefficient" and "immigrants are a burden on our country". Between the late 60s and early 90s, Democratic presidents deregulated the airlines and passed welfare reform; Republican presidents pushed immigration amnesties and founded the EPA.
What happened between then and now? Klein has two answers: a historical answer, and a structural answer.
Historical Answer: Dixiecrats Switched from Democrat to Republican.
When the North won the Civil War, it had grand plans to remake the South into a paradise of racial equality and universal love. After Lincoln's death, his successor Andrew Johnson decided this sounded hard and gave up. Within a few decades, the South was back to being a racist, paramilitary-violence-prone one-party dictatorship. That one party called itself "Democrat", but had few similiarites to the Democrats in the North. The Southern Democrats ("Dixiecrats") and northern Democrats disagreed on lots of issues, but the South hated the Republicans so much after their experience with Lincoln that they caucused with the northern Democrats anyway. This turned into a stable coalition, with northern Democrats agreeing to support the South against civil rights for blacks, and the Dixiecrats supporting the northern Democrats whenever they needed something.
But since the Democratic party contained both northern Democrats (relatively liberal) and Dixiecrats (relatively conservative), it didn't want to take a coherent party-wide stance on liberalism vs. conservatism. And by the median voter theorem, that meant the Republicans also didn't want to take a coherent stance on liberalism vs. conservatism. So both parties ended out centrist and identical.
In 1964, the Civil Rights Act threatened the Dixiecrats' key issue. It wasn't quite as simple as "Democrats were for it, Republicans were against it" - in fact, 80% of Republicans and 60% of Democrats supported it. But that year's presidential election pitted heavily pro-CRA Democrat Lyndon Johnson against anti-CRA Republican Barry Goldwater, beginning Southerners' defection to the Republican Party.
Klein says this successfully got all the conservatives on one side of the aisle and all the liberals on the other, allowing polarization to begin. Essentially, he believes polarization is a natural process, which the odd coalitions of the early 20th century temporarily prevented. Once the coalitions were broken, it could begin to do its work. He spends the rest of the book talking about why exactly polarization is so natural, what aspects of modernization have made it worse, and what sort of feedback loops make it keep going...
Structural Answer: Democratic Party More Successfull Resisting Polarization
But after a bit of this he regains his footing and segues into a stronger argument that might give even conservatives some food for thought. Klein notes that although both Democrats and Republicans have some extremists in their coalition, the institutional Democrats seem to be doing a better job preventing them from gaining power. In a purely structural sense, without getting into whether you believe they're morally equivalent or whatever, the democratic socialists/Bernie Sanders seem to be an "insurrection" comparable to the Tea Party/Trump on the Republican side. But the mainstream neoliberal Republicans surrendered to the Tea Party and to Trump in rapid succession, and the mainstream neoliberal Democrats are still resisting. The Democrats' Tea Party equivalent is probably AOC, but she and her allies are still a small minority in the Democratic caucus. And the Dem presidential nomination went to Joe Biden, a moderate who wouldn't look out of place running for president in 1988 (in fact...). Why We're Polarized was published too early to mention Biden in this context, but we can count him as a correct prediction for its theory.
Klein calls this "the Democratic party more successfully resisting polarization", and thinks of this as related to structural differences between the two parties. He says that the Republican Party represents the modal American on various characteristics, eg Christian (the most common religion), white (the most common race), straight (the most common sexual orientation), etc, whereas the Democrats represent everyone else (eg Muslims, Jews, atheists, and every minority religion; blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and every minority race; etc). That means the Republicans are more ideologically uniform - Christians are genuinely similar to other Christians, but Jews are only superficially similar to Muslims by virtue of their non-Christianness. That means ideology can't really capture the Democratic Party in the same way it captures the Republican Party. One point kind of in support of this - ask Democrats their favorite news source, and you get a long tail of stuff (most popular is CNN at 15%, then NPR at 13%, and so on). But ask conservatives and it's dominated by FOX (47%). Does this lack of news-source diversity reflect a lack of ideological diversity? Could be.
https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/book-review-why-were-polarized
The Necessary Logic of American Politics
Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 came as a shock to most political analysts, and spurred numerous analyses looking to explain the outcome. One insightful explanation comes from Ezra Klein’s book Why We’re Polarized. Klein sees the election as a culmination of our social psychology mixing with a media landscape designed to outrage, in a political system that incentivizes Republicans to become more extreme. We are hard-wired to protect our identities from external threats, and contemporary political parties have become strong proxies for the groups to which we belong. The media and politicians tap into our psychology that makes us react more strongly to threats and antagonism than to positivity. And the American political system was designed centuries ago to represent geography more than popularity in a way that makes Republican electoral success tied more to extreme stances than winning over swing voters. All of this, according to Klein, leads to “a legitimacy crisis that could threaten the very foundation of our political system.” The book’s claim that political parties now stand in for identities, in a way that leads to more polarization than was common in the 20th century, is convincing. However, Klein leaves important social factors unanalyzed, and there is reason to believe he is presenting current trends as more inevitable than they in fact are.
Listeners of Ezra Klein’s podcast will have noticed his focus has shifted away from technocratic policy discussions and towards broader philosophical questions. He has become more interested in talking about veganism or identity politics than the latest NBER paper on healthcare policy. Why We’re Polarized hits somewhere in the middle, using social science research to explain the circumstances that made America so polarized and led to a Donald Trump Presidency.
Klein’s narrative centers on the issue of identities, and the way shifting identities have impacted the current political climate. He draws on both social science and the history of partisanship in the United States to explain the current situation. Historically, a key part of his argument is that the current situation represents a break from mid-20th century norms.
History and social psychology
Most identities used to be weak predictors of one’s political party preference: In 1952, other than southerners and Protestants , no demographic had “more than a 10-percentage point difference in the percentage of its members represented within each party.” Moreover, ideology wasn’t much of a common thread within parties: In 1976, only 54% of Americans thought the Republican Party of Gerald Ford was more conservative than the Democratic Party of Jimmy Carter. When Roe v Wade was decided in 1973, opinions on abortion were essentially split within each party. Polls showed opposition to the Vietnam War was similar between the parties as well.
With parties not firmly defining policy preferences, voters oscillated between elections and split the ticket within races. Between 1972 and 1984, the average difference between how a state voted in one Presidential election and the next was 7.7 percentage points. But as the parties became firmer in the policies they supported, this number became 1.9 between 2000 and 2012. The correlation between parties of a district’s House representation and Presidential candidate went from 0.52 in 1972 to 0.97 in 2018.
In a chapter titled “Your Brain on Groups,” Klein dives into social psychology and political science research suggesting the key to understanding this shift is the way intergroup opposition shapes group decision making. Evidence suggests that our emotions are more heightened during moments of opposition rather than support. Even in the absence of objective differences, experiments show that people will establish arbitrary distinctions among themselves, quickly defining an “us” and “them” that impacts their treatments of each other. Opposition to the “other” is so strong in experiments that subjects “preferred to give their group less so long as it meant the gap between what they got and what the out-group got was bigger.”
Jerry Seinfeld was noting this phenomenon when he observed that sports fans have deep emotional attachments to what boils down to the color of the clothes their team wears. The players change teams, the teams change cities, and the most consistent thing is the uniform. Klein draws parallels between sports fanaticism and political partisanship – deep emotional attachments to our tribe winning, rather than diligent commitment to democratic discourse. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith remarked on the strong human desire to share in the sentiments of our peers but, notably, we care much more about our friends sharing feelings about our dislikes than our likes. Unsurprisingly, the easiest common ground to find with coworkers is complaining about a boss, or with friends is to gossip about a familiar person. This was brought to bear in the 2016 campaign – Trump’s campaign was much clearer about his opposition to The Swamp than what he stood for.
These dynamics are more or less hardwired into our social interaction. But we’ve become increasingly polarized as these in-group/out-group dynamics have reached a fever pitch in the political realm as various identities have become more aligned with one another into what Klein calls ‘mega-identities’. Our personal identities are a mix of characteristics like where we grew up, our gender, whether we eat meat, our religion, our musical tastes, or whether we own guns. Increasingly, these individual identities coincide more often than they do not. The people who are likely to do yoga in their free time are also likely to live in big cities, drive a Prius, watch MSNBC, and consider themselves non-religious.
Because of this, it is easier for individuals to perceive the political party they support as embodying their values, preferences, and in-groups. ‘Democrat’ or ‘Republican’ become simplified labels for an entire identity. These can be seen geographically and politically – Democrats today represent 78% of districts that have a Whole Foods, and Republicans represent 73% of districts that have a Cracker Barrel.
Klein notes that politics is no longer just an opinion on how to govern, it has become “a means of self-expression and group identity.” With all of our identities now so closely mapping onto a political party, it’s easy to see why any chance of that party losing feels like a threat to our entire personal identity, as if our way of life is under attack. He remarks that “elections feel like they decide whether our country belongs to us and whether we belong in it.”
Klein discusses a mid-20th century aberration in American politics that had much less party polarization. This period was defined by the clear us-versus-them political conflict of the Cold War. Americans then had a common enemy that they do not have today. The September 11th attacks provided national unity briefly, but those effects have petered out. With no common enemy abroad, are we left with no choice but to turn on each other? Polarization may be, as Tyler Cowen recently put to Klein, “the opiate of the masses.” While this does not discount Klein’s analysis, it does suggest our contemporary polarization is not inevitable. If a new enemy emerges, could we break out of our domestic polarization?
Our Brains Know We Need Our Groups to Survive
...Once (so this summary goes), the country’s two major political parties generated a weak sense of group affiliation. Economic classes, social types, and racial groups were distributed somewhat evenly between them, and so any one group’s influence on either party was softened. For fear of repelling a core constituency, the parties could not afford to become ideological monoliths.
Another way to put this is that the Democratic and Republican parties once performed, internally, the work of liberalism. They moderated passions, forced dissimilar people to coexist, and settled differences with compromise. They also, as Klein makes clear, formed a duopoly committed to moral complacency, especially on the issue of race. Then, in the nineteen-sixties, the Democrats passed major civil-rights legislation, and the American electorate began a great re-sorting. As black voters gravitated toward the Democrats, white voters fled toward the Republicans. Over time, the effects registered more broadly. Voting patterns are now highly correlated with religion, race, ethnicity, gender, and neighborhood, Klein notes. In the Trump era, each party has a world view that is internally coherent, and those world views are mutually exclusive and hostile to each other. Our social and partisan selves have all but merged.
Klein is a maestro at compactly and elegantly summarizing the work of others, and he patiently moves us through the scholarship of Alan Abramowitz on political polarization and Lilliana Mason on social polarization, along the way to concluding that “our political identities have become political mega-identities.” Then, in Chapter 3, he hits upon his big idea. When the two parties were less sorted, our politics worked helpfully against our deep tribal instincts. “The human mind,” Klein observes, “is exquisitely tuned to group affiliation and group difference”—so much so that, as soon as an affiliation has formed, the people who have affiliated with one another proceed to define themselves against an out-group. To make matters worse, Klein goes on, human groups compete less for resources than they do for social esteem, and esteem is zero-sum: more for you means less for me. We would rather “win” against the out-group and be worse off than be better off and lose.
“The mechanism is evolutionary,” Klein writes, because “our brains know we need our groups to survive.” The style of argumentation on display here will be familiar to most readers of contemporary nonfiction. Our distant ancestors were born into small, kinship-based bands; blind loyalty enhanced their chance for survival; they passed their loyalty genes down to us. By mixing experimental psychology with evolutionary biology, then aligning their findings with exciting new developments in cognitive neuroscience, political commentators can explain any social behavior by pointing to its origins in an adaptive advantage. Behind every parochial explanation lies Darwin, the Ultimate Explainer, whose influence has dominated the pop-intellectual mode since Richard Dawkins published “The Selfish Gene,” in 1976.
In a recent conversation with Klein, Ta-Nehisi Coates described “Why We’re Polarized” as a “cold, atheist book.” He had in mind the broadly systemic, impersonal framing of its argument. In place of a call to worship or to arms, Klein offers us a theory of human cognition, by which our inborn tendency to group chauvinism compromises our ability to reason. “What if our loyalties and prejudices are governed by instinct and merely rationalized as calculation?” he asks. There is an amiable hope at the center of the atheism: that we might remove the goggles of human partiality, acknowledge our character as a species, and build a better liberal polity, one that takes into account our tribal disposition. Klein exhorts us to do so with an easygoing intellectual generosity, as if to imply by the grace of his own example that science might lead us back to civility, and civility might heal us.
But Darwinian truisms are true only to the extent that they describe what is more or less fixed about the human animal. It may be that we “naturally form groups,” as Klein writes, but the groups that we form are not facts of nature; they are contingencies of time and place. Klein’s argument is addressed to a historical predicament—to the rise of polarization and, consequently, of Trump and Trumpism. But the authority that the book projects derives from ahistorical constructs, like brains and genes. Early on in “Why We’re Polarized,” Klein seems to suggest, accurately, that the core alliance of the modern G.O.P.—economic élites and poor whites—is the strategic creation of nameable individuals. But then those individuals recede from view. As elegant as the ensuing presentation is, I struggled to understand who the protagonist was. I think Klein did, too.
Humanity Had a Traumatic Childhood.
Why We’re Polarized fails to establish that polarization is the root of our democracy’s discontents. But the fact that America’s two major parties are now more ideologically and demographically distinct than ever before —while their respective partisans are more tightly wedded to their team and distrustful of the other one than at any time in living memory — is still a consequential development. And Klein’s account of how this came to be has much to recommend it.
His story (implicitly) begins 200,000 years ago in the Horn of Africa. There, humanity spent its formative years learning that the best way for a physically unremarkable but remarkably socially adept species of primate to thrive was to form tight-knit groups and then fortify them with collective cognitive biases. Natural selection endowed humans with extraordinary capacities for symbolic thought and reasoned argument. But if any of our early ancestors directed these tools toward the ruthless pursuit of objective truth — no matter how badly they alienated their clan or threatened its binding belief system — they were swiftly abandoned to the hyenas and removed from the gene pool. We are the descendants of men and women who mastered the art of chauvinistic self-delusion and in-group ingratiation. As a result, your brain treats your conscious mind as a president treats a press secretary: If disclosing a certain fact would undermine your ability to sell a narrative that flatters your team, then your brain will do its darndest to keep that intelligence out of your briefing. It is, of course, possible to apprehend a truth that contradicts the consensus of a social group with which you identify. But doing so requires swimming against the evolutionary tide — and, more often than not, increasing your identification with some other social group whose worldview is compatible with your newfound knowledge.
If our species’ traumatic childhood left us prone to identitarian delusions, it also tethered our self-esteem to the status of our in-groups. In humanity’s early years, the stakes of the relative standing between one band of hunter-gatherers and another were often life and death. Thus, prehistoric tribal conflicts bequeathed modern men and women an exquisite sensitivity to the rise and fall of our groups’ relative standing. To appreciate the awesome power of humanity’s instinct for pinning our emotional well-being to our side’s success in intergroup competition, recall that the outcomes of objectively inconsequential contests between athletes temporarily affiliated with our cities can bring grown-ass adults to heights of euphoria so vertiginous, they feel compelled to set fire to random parked cars — or to depths of despair so cavernous, they feel compelled to set fire to random parked cars.
Our minds’ tribalistic operating system worked great for the bulk of our species’ existence. But it’s always been an awkward fit for modern, pluralistic mass societies. And it poses especially acute challenges for a multiethnic liberal democracy whose historically dominant identity group is rapidly losing demographic supremacy and social status; which is to say, the United States.
The golden era of bipartisanship was (not coincidentally) an age of authoritarian white supremacy.
The tension between America’s white-supremacist foundations and its democratic ideals is not new. But for the bulk of our republic’s history, it was suppressed by the latter’s subordination to the former. The golden age of unpolarized parties and bipartisan comity that prevailed in the mid-20th century was underwritten by the subjugation of most African-Americans to authoritarian rule. The North’s abandonment of Reconstruction had moved the civil-rights question to the margins of our nation’s political life. And this enabled the two major parties to form socially and ideologically heterogeneous bases of support. The Civil War’s long shadow kept the white-supremacist South beneath the Democratic tent, even as the Donkey Party’s strength in northern cities brought immigrants, labor unions, and — after the onset of the Great Migration — African-Americans into “blue” America. The Republican Party meanwhile brought many secular urban professionals, Bible-thumping Western farmers, and reactionary financiers into a motley coalition. This state of affairs was terrible from the perspective of democratic accountability. But the demographic and ideological incoherence of the two-party system also barred America’s most wrenching intergroup divisions from the realm of partisan conflict.
In the early 20th century, a white, Christian, conservative Republican farmer did not experience the election of a Democratic president as an affront to the social standing of all of his identity groups: A victory for the party of Franklin Roosevelt and Strom Thurmond did not signify the triumph of a multiethnic conception of American identity over a white ethno-nationalist one, or of secular social liberals over Christian conservatives, or of urbanites over country folk. The two parties were simply too heterogenous for most Americans to view elections as clear referenda on the relative status of us and them. This enabled voters to toggle between partisan allegiances with relative ease, and allowed each party’s congressional leadership to form bipartisan alliances around transactional legislative compromises.
But the Democratic Party’s big tent eventually collapsed beneath the weight of its contradictions. As African-Americans migrated North in greater numbers, and the civil-rights movement forced Jim Crow into the spotlight, Democrats caved to their better angels — and thus, forfeited their stranglehold on Dixie. Over the ensuing decades, the South slowly but surely seceded from blue America. During the same period, the ascent of feminism and the Evangelical right turned questions of sexual morality into sources of partisan conflict, thereby cleaving America’s secular liberals and (white) religious conservatives into separate coalitions. And all the while, the unintended consequences of the the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 were gradually transforming the nation’s ethnic composition and dramatically increasing its foreign-born population. This would ultimately bring disputes over immigration policy — and between a (tacitly) ethno-national conception of American identity and a multicultural one — to the forefront of U.S. politics, where they would further divide college-educated urbanites from non-college-educated rural dwellers, and whites from nonwhites. Today, America’s most invidious social divides — and its most salient partisan divisions — are nearly identical; those who belong to an identity group on the “right” side of any one partisan divide are unprecedentedly unlikely to identify with a single social group on the “left” side of a different partisan dispute.
Run socially polarized politics through our primate brain’s primordial mainframe and it starts to overheat. Seeing our most frivolous social identities (e.g., “Red Sox Nation”) brought low by their rivals is enough to sink many of us into existential despair. Align the most fundamental dimensions of our self-conception behind one political party and let it compete with an agglomeration of all our out-groups for control over the state’s monopoly on violence, and you’ve got a recipe for something approaching civil war. In this context, politics becomes a venue for zero-sum fights over social status, rather than a vehicle for finding broadly agreeable solutions to our shared societal challenges. GOP voters might want health insurers to provide affordable coverage to people with preexisting conditions. But throughout the Obama era, they wanted to see their team defeat the other side more — even if doing so required inflicting economic damage on the nation as a whole.
What polarization data from 9 countries reveals about the US
In the mid-20th century, divisions within both the Republican and Democratic parties on race and civil rights warped the party system, with the two main parties containing what was functionally a four-party system: Democrats, Dixiecrats, liberal Northeastern Republicans, and Republicans. The Dixiecrats, in particular, were unusual: They were often conservative, but for reasons of history (the Republican Party had invaded and occupied the South in living memory) and strategy (amassing congressional seniority in the majority party helped them protect white supremacy in the South), they remained in the Democratic Party until the Civil Rights Act set the rupture of that alliance into motion.
This is also a reminder that there are worse things than polarization: The acceptance of white supremacy that held the Democrats and the Dixiecrats together was an abhorrent compromise, and reflects the reality that the alternative to polarization is often suppression, not consensus.
Because American political memory uses the 20th century as a baseline, there’s a dominant assumption that the current, high state of polarization is the aberration, and the relative comity of mid-century American politics the state of nature. But the truth is more likely the opposite: The mid-century system was weird, party polarization is natural and here to stay, and the path toward a functioning political system runs through reforming the structures of American government to work amid polarized parties.
I wouldn’t go so far as to assert that this international data set proves that argument right. But it’s consistent with it. The simplest interpretation of cross-country polarization trends is that America’s level of party polarization is reverting toward the international mean as the unusual forces that restrained party polarization in the US dissolve.
That isn’t to say polarization isn’t creating a crisis in American governance — I think it is. But that crisis reflects the interaction between polarized parties and our weird political system, which requires high levels of cross-party consensus to function. In other political systems, where winning elections means gaining a governing majority, polarized parties are much less of a long-term threat.
https://www.vox.com/2020/1/24/21076232/polarization-america-international-party-political
Why the media is so polarized — and how it polarizes us
Read an excerpt from Why We’re Polarized, the new book by Ezra Klein.
https://www.vox.com/2020/1/28/21077888/why-were-polarized-media-book-ezra-news
Interviews;
Ezra Klein on Why We’re Polarized (Ep. 86) In his second appearance, Ezra
talks about what we get wrong when we talk about politics.
https://conversationswithtyler.com/episodes/ezra-klein-2/
https://www.wired.com/story/why-are-we-polarized-dont-blame-social-media-ezra-klein/
