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Populism - political program or movement that champions, or - claims to champion, the common person, usually by favourable contrast with a real or perceived elite or establishment.
Populism -
- The term populism can designate either democratic or authoritarian movements.
- Populism is typically critical of political representation and anything that mediates the relation between the people and their leader or government.
In its most - democratic form - populism seeks to defend the interests and maximize the power of ordinary citizens, through reform rather than revolution. In the United States the term was applied to the program of the Populist Movement, which gave rise to the Populist, or People’s, Party in 1892. Many of the party’s demands were later adopted as laws or constitutional amendments (e.g., a progressive tax system). The populist demand for direct democracy through popular initiatives and referenda also become a reality in a number of U.S. states.
- revolves around a charismatic leader who appeals to and claims to embody the will of the people in order to consolidate his own power.
- In this personalized form of politics, political parties lose their importance, and elections serve to confirm the leader’s authority rather than to reflect the different allegiances of the people.
- Some forms of authoritarian populism have been characterized by extreme nationalism, racism, conspiracy mongering, and scapegoating of marginalized groups, each of which served to consolidate the leader’s power, to distract public attention from the leader’s failures, or to conceal from the people the nature of the leader’s rule or the real causes of economic or social problems.
- In the second half of the 20th century, populism came to be identified with the political style and program of Latin American leaders such as Juan Perón, Getúlio Vargas, and Hugo Chávez.
- In the early 21st century, populist authoritarian regimes arose in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, among other countries.
The term populist is often used pejoratively to criticize a politician for pandering to a people’s fear and enthusiasm.
Depending on one’s view of populism, a populist economic program can therefore signify either;
- a platform that promotes the interests of common citizens and the country as a whole
- or a platform that seeks to redistribute wealth to gain popularity, without regard to the consequences for the country such as inflation or debt.
André Munro - The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica
https://www.britannica.com/topic/populism
Defining Populism - Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
Populism is a term used in a variety of contexts, so it is important to clarify what we mean by it. Our definition follows the Ideational Approach to the study of populism.
Populists are united by two claims: first, that a country’s “true people” are locked in a moral conflict with “outsiders”, and second, that nothing should constrain the will of the “true people”.
Rather than seeing politics as a contest between different policy positions,
populists argue that the political arena is a moral battleground between right and wrong, that is between a country’s “true people” and the elites or other groups that populists deem to be outsiders, such as ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants and criminals.
Anti-elitism always features prominently in populist rhetoric, and the moral conflict between the “good people” and the “corrupt elite” is one of the most important threads through populist narratives.
Following our previous reports Populists in Power Around the World, High Tide? Populism in Power 1990–2020 and Populists in Power: Perils and Prospects in 2021, we can place populist leaders into three sub-categories:
- Cultural populism claims that the “true people” are the native members of the nation state, and outsiders can include immigrants, criminals, ethnic and religious minorities, and cosmopolitan elites. Populists argue that these groups pose a threat to “the people” by not sharing their values. Cultural populists tend to emphasise religious traditionalism, law and order, anti-immigration positions and national sovereignty.
- Socioeconomic populism claims that the “true people” are the honest, hard-working members of the working class, and outsiders are the big businesses, capital owners and international financial institutions benefitting unjustly from the working class’s difficult economic circumstances. This form of populism is almost always accompanied by a left-wing economic ideology, though the specific policy agenda varies across contexts.
- Anti-establishment populism claims that the “true people” are hard-working victims of a state run by special interests. Often, these special interests are the elites empowered by a former regime (such as former communists in Eastern Europe). Although all forms of populism are anti-establishment, this form distinguishes itself by focusing on establishment elites as the primary enemy of the people and does not sow as many intra-society divisions. Anti-establishment populists tend to compete on issue areas outside the typical left/right political divide, such as corruption, democratic reform and transparency.
We classified leaders as populist if they were initially elected in free and fair elections and employed substantial populist rhetoric during their campaigns. Our classification is not based on the leaders’ actions while in office but on how they won office in the first place. We continue to define such leaders as populists as long as they remain in office, even if subsequent elections are not free and fair. Because of this, there are several autocrats, such as Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus and Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, on our list of populist leaders. Our reports from
November 2018 and February 2020 offer further discussion of our classification methodology.Why Is Populism a Problem?
The core populist idea, that of a homogeneous “true people” whose will provides the only basis for legitimacy, conflicts with the core democratic value of pluralism. Pluralism is the recognition that society comprises diverse groups (religious, ethnic, economic and so on) and that each of these groups can govern in accordance with its interests and preferences, as long as it can convince a sufficient number of other groups to join it to constitute a majority. This process of persuasion involves give-and-take between differing groups as none usually has enough support to govern on its own and each needs to make some concessions to others to persuade them to join. Populist leaders’ rejection of pluralism therefore undermines a central tenet of liberal democracy.
Many of the institutions of liberal democracy, such as checks and balances in the legislative process and a free press, exist in large part to restrain those in power so that other groups are treated fairly and have a fair chance to compete for power in the future. These institutions benefit would-be populists when they are not in power, but populists threaten to dismantle them once they are in power in order to cement their position. Populist leaders often attack independent institutions like the judiciary and central banks and enact reforms to make them more subservient to the executive.
As well as pluralism and institutional constraints, central to any liberal democracy is the peaceful transfer of power, by which leaders who lose an election are expected to willingly hand power to the opponents who beat them in free and fair elections.
Whether implicitly or explicitly, populists tend to weaken some or all of these norms and institutions. This is known as democratic backsliding. In a previous report, we found that democratic backsliding was more likely under populist leaders than other democratically elected leaders, with populists being more likely to erode checks on executive power, press freedom and other civil liberties. What is most concerning about populists who achieve power is that, by undermining these norms and institutions, they may do permanent damage to liberal democracy.
Wikipedia - Populism; refers to a range of political stances that emphasize the idea of "the people" and often juxtapose this group against "the elite." The term developed in the late 19th century and has been applied to various politicians, parties and movements since that time, often as a pejorative. Within political science and other social sciences, several different definitions of populism have been employed, with some scholars proposing that the term be rejected altogether.
A common framework for interpreting populism is known as the ideational approach: this defines populism as an ideology which presents "the people" as a morally good force and contrasts them against "the elite," who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving. Populists differ in how "the people" are defined, but it can be based along class, ethnic, or national lines. Populists typically present "the elite" as comprising the political, economic, cultural, and media establishment, depicted as a homogeneous entity and accused of placing their own interests, and often the interests of other groups—such as large corporations, foreign countries, or immigrants—above the interests of "the people." Populist parties and social movements are often led by charismatic or dominant figures who present themselves as "the voice of the people." According to the ideational approach, populism is often combined with other ideologies, such as nationalism, liberalism, or socialism. Thus, populists can be found at different locations along the left–right political spectrum, and there exist both left-wing populism and right-wing populism.
Other scholars of the social sciences have defined the term populism differently. According to the popular agency definition used by some historians of United States history, populism refers to popular engagement of the population in political decision making. An approach associated with the political scientist Ernesto Laclau presents populism as an emancipatory social force through which marginalised groups challenge dominant power structures. Some economists have used the term in reference to governments which engage in substantial public spending financed by foreign loans, resulting in hyperinflation and emergency measures. In popular discourse—where the term has often been used pejoratively—it has sometimes been used synonymously with demagogy, to describe politicians who present overly simplistic answers to complex questions in a highly emotional manner, or with opportunism, to characterise politicians who seek to please voters without rational consideration as to the best course of action.
Ideational definition
A common approach to defining populism is known as the ideational approach. This emphasises the notion that populism should be defined according to specific ideas which underlie it, as opposed to certain economic policies or leadership styles which populist politicians may display. In this definition, the term populism is applied to political groups and individuals who make appeals to "the people" and then contrast this group against "the elite".
Adopting this approach, Albertazzi and McDonnell define populism as an ideology that "pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice". Similarly, the political scientist Carlos de la Torre defined populism as "a Manichean discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block."
In this understanding, note Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "populism always involves a critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common people", and according to Ben Stanley, populism itself is a product of "an antagonistic relationship" between "the people" and "the elite", and is "latent wherever the possibility occurs for the emergence of such a dichotomy". The political scientist Manuel Anselmi proposed that populism be defined as featuring a "homogenous community-people" which "perceives itself as the absolute holder of popular sovereignty" and "expresses an anti-establishment attitude." This understanding conceives of populism as a discourse, ideology, or worldview. These definitions were initially employed largely in Western Europe, although later became increasingly popular in Eastern Europe and the Americas.
According to this approach, populism is viewed as a "thin ideology" or "thin-centred ideology" which on its own is seen as too insubstantial to provide a blueprint for societal change. It thus differs from the "thick-centred" or "full" ideologies such as fascism, liberalism, and socialism, which provide more far-reaching ideas about social transformation. As a thin-centred ideology, populism is therefore attached to a thick-ideology by populist politicians. Thus, populism can be found merged with forms of nationalism, liberalism, socialism, federalism, or conservatism. According to Stanley, "the thinness of populism ensures that in practice it is a complementary ideology: it does not so much overlap with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies."
Populism is, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "a kind of mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality". Mudde noted that populism is "moralistic rather than programmatic". It encourages a binary world-view in which everyone is divided into "friends and foes", with the latter being regarded not just as people who have "different priorities and values" but as being fundamentally "evil". In emphasising one's purity against the corruption and immorality of "the elite", from which "the people" must remain pure and untouched, populism prevents compromise between different groups.
Right and Left-Wing
As a result of the various different ideologies with which populism can be paired, the forms that populism can take vary widely. Populism itself cannot be positioned on the left–right political spectrum, and both right and left-wing populisms exist. Populist movements can also mix divisions between left and right, for instance by combining xenophobic attitudes commonly associated with the far-right with redistributive economic policies closer to those of the left.
The ideologies with which populism can be paired can be contradictory, resulting in different forms of populism that can oppose each other. For instance, in Latin America during the 1990s, populism was often associated with politicians like Peru's Alberto Fujimori who promoted neoliberal economics, while in the 2000s it was instead associated with those like Venezuela's Hugo Chávez who promoted socialist programs. As well as populists of the left and right, populist figures like Italy's Beppe Grillo have been characterised as centrist and liberals, while groups like Turkey's Justice and Development Party have been described as combining populism with Islamism, and India's Bharatiya Janata Party has been seen as mixing populism with Hindu nationalism. Although populists of different ideological traditions can oppose each other, they can also form coalitions, as was seen in the Greek coalition government which brought together the left-wing populist Syriza and the right-wing populist Independent Greeks in 2015.
Adherents of the ideational definition have also drawn a distinction between left and right-wing populists. The latter are presented as juxtaposing "the people" against both "the elite" and an additional group who are also regarded as being separate from "the people" and whom "the elite" is seen to favour, such as immigrants, homosexuals, travellers, or communists. Populist leaders thus "come in many different shades and sizes" but, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, share one common element: "a carefully crafted image of the vox populi". Stanley expressed the view that although there are "certain family resemblances" that can be seen between populist groups and individuals, there was "no coherent tradition" unifying all of them. While many left-wing parties in the early 20th century presented themselves as the vanguard of the proletariat, by the early 21st century left-wing populists were presenting themselves as the "voice of the people" more widely. On the political right, populism is often combined with nationalism, with "the people" and "the nation" becoming fairly interchangeable categories in their discourse. Some political scientists have also argued that populism can be divided into "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" forms.
"The People"
For populists, "the people" are presented as being homogeneous, and also virtuous. In simplifying the complexities of reality, the concept of "the people" is vague and flexible, with this plasticity benefitting populists who are thus able to "expand or contract" the concept "to suit the chosen criteria of inclusion or exclusion" at any given time. In employing the concept of "the people", populists can encourage a sense of shared identity among different groups within a society and facilitate their mobilisation toward a common cause. One of the ways that populists employ the understanding of "the people" is in the idea that "the people are sovereign", that in a democratic state governmental decisions should rest with the population and that if they are ignored then they might mobilise or revolt. This is the sense of "the people" employed in the late 19th century United States by the People's Party and which has also been used by later populist movements in that country.
A second way in which "the people" is conceived by populists combines a socioeconomic or class based category with one that refers to certain cultural traditions and popular values. The concept seeks to vindicate the dignity of a social group who regard themselves as being oppressed by a dominant "elite" who are accused of treating "the people's" values, judgements, and tastes with suspicion or contempt. A third use of "the people" by populists employs it as a synonym for "the nation", whether that national community be conceived in either ethnic or civic terms. In such a framework, all individuals regarded as being "native" to a particular state, either by birth or by ethnicity, could be considered part of "the people".
Populism typically entails "celebrating them as the people", in Stanley's words. The political scientist Paul Taggart proposed the term "the heartland" to better reflect what populists often mean in their rhetoric. According to Taggart, "the heartland" was the place "in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population resides". Who this "heartland" is can vary between populists, even within the same country. For instance, in Britain, the centre-right Conservative Party conceived of "Middle England" as its heartland, while the far-right British National Party conceived of the "native British people" as its heartland. Mudde noted that for populists, "the people" "are neither real nor all-inclusive, but are in fact a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population". They are an imagined community, much like the imagined communities embraced and promoted by nationalists.
Populism often entails presenting "the people" as the underdog. Populists typically seek to reveal to "the people" how they are oppressed. In doing so, they do not seek to change "the people", but rather seek to preserve the latter's "way of life" as it presently exists, regarding it as a source of good. For populists, the way of life of "the people" is presented as being rooted in history and tradition and regarded as being conducive to public good. Although populist leaders often present themselves as representatives of "the people", they often come from elite strata in society; examples like Berlusconi, Fortuyn, and Haider were all well-connected to their country's political and economic elites.
Populism can also be subdivided into "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" forms, which differ in their conceptions of who "the people" are. Inclusionary populism tends to define "the people" more broadly, accepting and advocating for minority and marginalised groups, while exclusionary populism defines "the people" in a much stricter sense, generally being focused on a particular sociocultural group and antagonistic against minority groups. However, this is not exactly a pure dichotomy – exclusive populists can still give voice to those who feel marginalised by the political status quo and include minorities if it is advantageous, while inclusive populists can vary significantly in how inclusive they actually are. In addition, all populisms are implicitly exclusionary, since they define "the people" against "the elite", thus some scholars argue that the difference between populisms is not whether a particular populism excludes but whom it excludes from its conception of "the people".
"The Elite"
Anti-elitism is widely considered the central characteristic feature of populism,[89] although Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argued that anti-elitism alone was not evidence of populism.[90] Rather, according to Stanley, in populist discourse the "fundamental distinguishing feature" of "the elite" is that it is in an "adversarial relationship" with "the people". In defining "the elite", populists often condemn not only the political establishment, but also the economic elite, cultural elite, academic elite, and the media elite, which they present as one homogeneous, corrupt group. In early 21st century India, the populist Bharatiya Janata Party for instance accused the dominant Indian National Congress party, the Communist Party of India, NGOs, academia, and the English-language media of all being part of "the elite".
When operating in liberal democracies, populists often condemn dominant political parties as part of "the elite" but at the same time do not reject the party political system altogether, instead either calling for or claiming to be a new kind of party different from the others. Although condemning almost all those in positions of power within a given society, populists often exclude both themselves and those sympathetic to their cause even when they too are in positions of power. For instance, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a right-wing populist group, regularly condemned "the media" in Austria for defending "the elite", but excluded from that the Kronen Zeitung, a widely read tabloid that supported the FPÖ and its leader Jörg Haider.
When populists take governmental power, they are faced with a challenge in that they now represent a new elite. In such cases—like Chávez in Venezuela and Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia—populists retain their anti-establishment rhetoric by making changes to their concept of "the elite" to suit their new circumstances, alleging that real power is not held by the government but other powerful forces who continue to undermine the populist government and the will of "the people" itself. In these instances, populist governments often conceptualise "the elite" as those holding economic power. In Venezuela, for example, Chávez blamed the economic elite for frustrating his reforms, while in Greece, the left-wing populist Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras accused "the lobbyists and oligarchs of Greece" of undermining his administration. In populist instances like these, the claims made have some basis in reality, as business interests seek to undermine leftist-oriented economic reform.
Although left-wing populists who combine populist ideas with forms of socialism most commonly present "the elite" in economic terms, the same strategy is also employed by some right-wing populists. In the United States during the late 2000s, the Tea Party movement—which presented itself as a defender of the capitalist free market—argued that big business, and its allies in Congress, seeks to undermine the free market and kill competition by stifling small business.[94] Among some 21st century right-wing populists, "the elite" are presented as being left-wing radicals committed to political correctness.[96] The Dutch right-wing populist leader Pim Fortuyn referred to this as the "Church of the Left".
In some instances, particularly in Latin America and Africa, "the elites" are conceived not just in economic but also in ethnic terms, representing what political scientists have termed ethnopopulism. In Bolivia, for example, the left-wing populist leader Evo Morales juxtaposed the mestizo and indigenous "people" against an overwhelmingly European "elite",[98] declaring that "We Indians [i.e. indigenous people] are Latin America's moral reserve". In the Bolivian case, this was not accompanied by a racially exclusionary approach, but with an attempt to build a pan-ethnic coalition which included European Bolivians against the largely European Bolivian elite. In South Africa, the populist Julius Malema has presented black South Africans as the "people" whom he claims to represent, calling for the expropriation of land owned by the white minority without compensation. In areas like Europe where nation-states are more ethnically homogenous, this ethnopopulist approach is rare given that the "people" and "elite" are typically of the same ethnicity.
For some populist leaders and movements, the term "the elite" also refers to an academic or intellectual establishment and, as such, entails scholars, intellectuals, experts, or organized science as a whole. Such leaders and movements may criticise scientific knowledge as abstract, useless, and ideologically biased, and instead demand common sense, experiential knowledge, and practical solutions to be "true knowledge". Examples of such a "science-related populism" are British Conservative Party politician Michael Gove suggesting that the British people "have had enough of experts" or US entrepreneur Peter Thiel praising common sense as an "incredible indictment of our elites".
In various instances, populists claim that "the elite" is working against the interests of the country. In the European Union (EU), for instance, various populist groups allege that their national political elites put the interests of the EU itself over those of their own nation-states. Similarly, in Latin America populists often charge political elites with championing the interests of the United States over those of their own countries.
Another common tactic among populists, particularly in Europe, is the accusation that "the elites" place the interests of immigrants above those of the native population. The Zambian populist Michael Sata for instance adopted a xenophobic stance during his campaigns by focusing his criticism on the country's Asian minority, decrying Chinese and Indian ownership of businesses and mines. In India, the right-wing populist leader Narendra Modi rallied supporters against Muslim Bangladeshi migrants, promising to deport them. In instances where populists are also antisemitic (such as Jobbik in Hungary and Attack in Bulgaria) the elites are accused of favouring Israeli and wider Jewish interests above those of the national group. Antisemitic populists often accuse "the elite" of being made up of many Jews as well. When populists emphasise ethnicity as part of their discourse, "the elite" can sometimes be presented as "ethnic traitors".
General Will
A third component of the ideational approach to populism is the idea of the general will, or volonté générale. An example of this populist understanding of the general will can be seen in Chávez's 2007 inaugural address, when he stated that "All individuals are subject to error and seduction, but not the people, which possesses to an eminent degree of consciousness of its own good and the measure of its independence. Because of that its judgement is pure, its will is strong, and none can corrupt or even threaten it." For populists, the general will of "the people" is something that should take precedence over the preferences of "the elite".
As noted by Stanley, the populist idea of the general will is connected to ideas of majoritarianism and authenticity. Highlighting how populists appeal to the ideals of "authenticity and ordinariness", he noted that what was most important to populists was "to appeal to the idea of an authentic people" and to cultivate the idea that they are the "genuine" representatives of "the people". In doing so they often emphasise their physical proximity to "the people" and their distance from "the elites". Sheri Berman notes that while populists often engage in democratic rhetoric, they frequently ignore or devalue norms of liberal democracy such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, legitimate opposition, separation of powers and constraints on presidential power.
In emphasising the general will, many populists share the critique of representative democratic government previously espoused by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This approach regards representative governance as an aristocratic and elitist system in which a country's citizens are regarded as passive entities. Rather than choosing laws for themselves, these citizens are only mobilised for elections in which their only option is to select their representatives rather than taking a more direct role in legislation and governance. Populists often favour the use of direct democratic measures such as referendums and plebiscites. For this reason, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that "it can be argued that an elective affinity exists between populism and direct democracy", although Stanley cautioned that "support for direct democracy is not an essential attribute of populism." Populist notions of the "general will" and its links with populist leaders are usually based on the idea of "common sense".
Versus Elitism and Pluralism
Stanley noted that rather than being restricted purely to populists, appeals to "the people" had become "an unavoidable aspect of modern political practice", with elections and referendums predicated on the notion that "the people" decide the outcome. Thus, a critique of the ideational definition of populism is that it becomes too broad and can potentially apply to all political actors and movements. Responding to this critique, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argued that the ideational definition did allow for a "non-populism" in the form of both elitism and pluralism.
Elitists share the populist binary division but reverse the associations. Whereas populists regard the elites as bad and the common people as good, elitists view "the people" as being vulgar, immoral, and dangerous and "the elites" as being morally, culturally, and intellectually superior. Elitists want politics to be largely or entirely an elite affair; some—such as Spain's Francisco Franco and Chile's Augusto Pinochet—reject democracy altogether, while others—like Spain's José Ortega y Gasset and Austria's Joseph Schumpeter—support a limited model of democracy.
Pluralism differs from both elitism and populism by rejecting any dualist framework, instead viewing society as a broad array of overlapping social groups, each with their own ideas and interests. Pluralists argue that political power should not be held by any single group—whether defined by their gender, ethnicity, economic status, or political party membership—and should instead be distributed. Pluralists encourage governance through compromise and consensus in order to reflect the interests of as many of these groups as possible. Unlike populists, pluralists do not believe that such a thing as a "general will" exists. Some politicians do not seek to demonise a social elite; for many conservatives for example, the social elite are regarded as the bulwark of the traditional social order, while for some liberals, the social elite are perceived as an enlightened legislative and administrative cadre.
Other definitions
The popular agency definition to populism uses the term in reference to a democratic way of life that is built on the popular engagement of the population in political activity. In this understanding, populism is usually perceived as a positive factor in the mobilisation of the populace to develop a communitarian form of democracy. This approach to the term is common among historians in the United States and those who have studied the late 19th century People's Party.
The Laclauan definition of populism, so called after the Argentinian political theorist Ernesto Laclau who developed it, uses the term in reference to what proponents regard as an emancipatory force that is the essence of politics. In this concept of populism, it is believed to mobilise excluded sectors of society against dominant elites and changing the status quo. Laclau's initial emphasis was on class antagonisms arising between different classes, although he later altered his perspective to claim that populist discourses could arise from any part of the socio-institutional structure. For Laclau, socialism was "the highest form of populism". His understandings of the topic derived in large part from his focus on politics in Latin America. This definition is popular among critics of liberal democracy and is widely used in critical studies and in studies of West European and Latin American politics. Harry C. Boyte for example defined populism as "a politics of civic agency" which "develops the power of 'the people' to shape their destiny", as examples citing both the Russian narodniks and the South African Black Consciousness Movement.
The socioeconomic definition of populism applies the term to what it regards as an irresponsible form of economic policy by which a government engages in a period of massive public spending financed by foreign loans, after which the country falls into hyperinflation and harsh economic adjustments are then imposed. This use of the term was used by economists like Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey Sachs and was particularly popular among scholars of Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. Since that time, this definition continued to be used by some economists and journalists, particularly in the US, but was uncommon among other social sciences. This definition relies on focusing on socialist and other left-wing forms of populism; it does not apply to other groups commonly understood as populist which adopted right-wing stances on economic issues.
An additional framework has been described as the "political-strategic" approach. This applies the term populism to a political strategy in which a charismatic leader seeks to govern based on direct and unmediated connection with their followers. Kurt Weyland defined this conception of populism as "a political strategy through which a personalist leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers". This is a definition of the term that is popular among scholars of non-Western societies. By focusing on leadership, this concept of populism does not allow for the existence of populist parties or populist social movements; under this definition, for instance, the US People's Party which first invented the term populism could not be considered populist. Mudde suggested that although the idea of a leader having direct access to "the people" was a common element among populists, it is best regarded as a feature which facilitates rather than defines populism.
In popular discourse, populism is sometimes used in a negative sense in reference to politics which involves promoting extremely simple solutions to complex problems in a highly emotional manner. Mudde suggested that this definition "seems to have instinctive value" but was difficult to employ empirically because almost all political groups engage in sloganeering and because it can be difficult to differentiate an argument made emotionally from one made rationally. Mudde thought that this phenomenon was better termed demagogy rather than populism. Another use of the term in popular discourse is to describe opportunistic policies designed to quickly please voters rather than deciding a more rational course of action. Examples of this would include a governing political party lowering taxes before an election or promising to provide things to the electorate which the state cannot afford to pay for. Mudde suggested that this phenomenon is better described as opportunism rather than populism.
Demand-Side Factors
One area of debate in explaining populism is whether its main cause is based in the needs of citizens (demand-side explanations) or in the failures of governments (supply-side explanations). In focusing on the changing grievances or demands of citizens, demand-side explanations can be seen as bottom-up explanations, while supply-side explanations, in focusing on political actors and institutions, can be seen as top-down explanations. Various demand-side factors have been claimed to make it more likely that individuals will support populist ideas. Economists and political economists often emphasize the importance of economic concerns while political scientists and sociologists often emphasize sociocultural concerns in their analysis of demand-side factors.
Economic Grievance
The economic grievance thesis argues that economic factors, such as deindustrialisation, economic liberalisation, and deregulation, are causing the formation of a 'left-behind' precariat with low job security, high inequality, and wage stagnation, who then support populism. Some theories only focus on the effect of economic crises, or inequality.
The evidence of increasing economic disparity and volatility of family incomes is clear, particularly in the United States, as shown by the work of Thomas Piketty and others. Commentators such as Martin Wolf emphasize the importance of economics. They warn that such trends increase resentment and make people susceptible to populist rhetoric. Evidence for this is mixed. At the macro level, political scientists report that xenophobia, anti-immigrant feeling, and resentment towards out-groups tend to be higher during difficult economic times. Economic crises have been associated with gains by right-wing political parties. However, there is little evidence at the micro- or individual level to link individual economic grievances and populist support.
Modernisation
The modernisation losers theory argues that certain aspects of transition to modernity have caused demand for populism. Some arguments rely on the belief that anomie has followed industrialisation and resulted in "dissolution, fragmentation and differentiation", weakening the traditional ties of civil society, and increasing individualization. Populism offers a broad identity which gives sovereignty to the previously marginalized masses as "the people". However, empirical studies suggest that supporters of radical right-wing populism occur across the social spectrum, and are not more likely to appear in groups defined as "modernisation losers".
Cultural Backlash
Other theories argue that grievances have a primarily sociocultural rather than an economic basis. For example, the cultural backlash thesis argues that right-wing populism is reaction to the rise of postmaterialism in many developed countries, including the spread of feminism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism. According to this view, the spread of ideas and values through a society challenges accepted norms until society reaches a 'tipping point', which causes a reaction, in this case support for right-wing populism. Some theories limit this argument to being a reaction to just the increase of ethnic diversity from immigration. Such theories are particularly popular with sociologists and with political scientists studying industrial world and American politics.
The empiric studies testing this theory have produced highly contradicting results. At the micro- or individual level, there are strong connections between individual positions on sociocultural issues (such as immigration policy and "racial animus") and right-wing populist voting. However, at the macro level, studies have not shown clear relationships between measures of populist sentiment in countries and actual right-wing party support.
However, there is strong evidence from political scientists and political psychologists documenting the influence of group-based identity threats on voters. Those who identify as part of a group and perceive it as being under threat are likely to support political actors who promise to protect the status and identity of their group. While such research often focuses on white identity, results apply broadly to other social groups that perceive themselves to be under threat.
Recent Democratization
The length of time since a country has been democratized has also been linked to its potential for populist success. This is claimed to be because younger democracies have less established political parties and weaker liberal democratic norms. For example, populist success in Eastern Europe has been linked to the legacy of communism. However, this explanation suffers from the lack of success of populism in most post-communist countries.
Supply-Side Factors
Supply-side explanations focus on political actors and institutions and the ways in which governments may fail to respond to the changing conditions that affect citizens. Economic, social, and other structural trends are seen as being modified by institutions as they determine political outcomes. In this view, citizens turn to populism when governments do not respond effectively to the challenges they and their citizens face. Research supports the idea that populism is more likely to thrive when mainstream parties on the center-left and center-right do not address important contemporary issues and do not offer clear alternatives to voters. Coalitions that blur distinctions on positions are also likely to increase populism.
In Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Samuel P. Huntington argues that rapid change (social or economic) in a society will increase the demands of its citizens. Unless political institutions are responsive and effective, they are unlikely to respond to and satisfy such demands. If political systems are weak or have become unresponsive over time, then dissatisfaction, political disorder and even violence become more likely. Political institutions that do not respond to social and economic changes are likely to fail. Responsive political systems can adapt to more severe challenges than unresponsive ones. Huntington's ideas grew out of work on Third World countries, but are also applicable to advanced industrial countries.
In a supply-side view of American politics, populism can be seen as a symptom of institutional decay. It can be suggested that political factors such as gerrymandering, the Electoral College, special-interest lobbying and dark money, are distorting political and economic debate, and decreasing the ability of the government to respond to the concerns of large numbers of citizens. This in turn generates dissatisfaction, which may increase the likelihood that citizens will support populism. Scholars studying the European Union have suggested that European integration may have had the undesired effect of decreasing the system's responsiveness to voters, as law and policy-making increasingly became the responsibility of the European Union. This too may have increased support for populism. Institutions such as the European Central Bank may also distance decision-making from electoral power. It has been argued that political parties themselves have become disconnected from society, and unable to respond to citizen's concerns...
Right-Wing Populism
Right-wing populism, also called national populism and right-wing nationalism, is a political ideology which combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes. Like left-wing populism, it employs anti-elitist sentiments, opposition to the Establishment, and speaking to or for the "common people". However, populists of the right generally focus on cultural issues, often aim to defend a national culture and identity against perceived attacks by outsiders, whereas left-wing populists more frequently employ economic arguments and attack neoliberalism and the role of large corporations in society.
Right-wing populism in the Western world is generally associated with ideologies such as anti-environmentalism, neo-nationalism, anti-globalization, nativism, and protectionism. In Europe, the term is often used to describe groups, politicians, and political parties that are generally known for their opposition to immigration, especially from the Muslim world, and for Euroscepticism. Right-wing populists may support expanding the welfare state, but only for those they deem are fit to receive it; this concept has been referred to as "welfare chauvinism". However, populist right-libertarian, communitarian and liberal conservative movements that eschew xenophobia also exist.
From the 1990s, right-wing populist parties became established in the legislatures of various democracies. Although extreme right-wing movements in the United States (where they are normally referred to as the "radical right") are usually characterized as a separate entity, some writers consider them to be a part of a broader, right-wing populist phenomenon.
Since the Great Recession, European right-wing populist movements such as the National Rally (formerly the National Front) in France, the League in Italy, the Party for Freedom and the Forum for Democracy in the Netherlands, the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats, Danish People's Party, the Freedom Party of Austria, the UK Independence Party and the Brexit Party began to grow in popularity, in large part due to increasing opposition to immigration from the Middle East and Africa, rising Euroscepticism and discontent with the economic policies of the European Union. Former U.S. President Donald Trump won the 2016 United States presidential election after running on a platform that included right-wing populist themes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-wing_populism
Left-Wing Populism
Left-wing populism, also called social populism, is a political ideology that combines left-wing politics with populist rhetoric and themes. Its rhetoric often consists of anti-elitism, opposition to the Establishment and speaking for the "common people". Recurring themes for left-wing populists include economic democracy, social justice, and skepticism of globalization. Socialist theory plays a lesser role than in traditional left-wing ideologies.
Criticism of capitalism and globalization is linked to antimilitarism, which has increased in left populist movements as a result of unpopular United States military operations, especially those in the Middle East. It is considered that the populist left does not exclude others horizontally and relies on egalitarian ideals. Some scholars point out nationalist left-wing populist movements as well, a feature exhibited by the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua or the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela. Unlike exclusionary or right-wing populism, left-wing populist parties tend to claim to be supportive of minority rights and to an idea of nationality that is not delimited by cultural or ethnic particularisms.
With the rise of Greek Syriza, Spanish Podemos during the European debt crisis, there has been increased debate on new left-wing populism in Europe.
Traditionally, left-wing populism has been associated with the socialist movement, but since the 2010s, there has been a movement close to left-wing populism in the left-liberal camp. However, some of them are considered social democratic positions.
Republicans have taken sharp populist turn in the Trump era:
The Republican Party's transformation is apparent at any Donald Trump rally: The crowd is filled with working-class voters, many without college degrees, who are in lockstep with him on issues where he has overhauled the party's platform, from immigration to trade to foreign policy.
An analysis of a decade's worth of Reuters/Ipsos polls shows how the U.S. Republican electorate has shifted in its makeup and views. The classic "country club" Republican, well-off and well-educated, now makes up a smaller slice of the pie.
In its place is a Republican electorate that is more isolationist, more skeptical of globalization, more suspicious of the electoral process and more likely to view Democrats as a threat than it was when former President Trump launched his first run for the White House in 2015.
Even with Trump out of office, the shift is affecting U.S. policy in Congress where hardline House Republicans for five months have blocked Democratic President Joe Biden's pleas for more aid for Ukraine as it fights off a Russian invasion.
A few years ago, senior Republicans were typically Russia hawks and the people at the top of the party, such as 2012 presidential nominee Mitt Romney, were strong proponents of free trade. Not anymore.
Some of the changes are stark: One in five Republicans today say the U.S. should often flex its military muscle to achieve foreign policy goals, down from one in three a decade ago. Just half say they have "at least some" confidence in election integrity, down from two-thirds who previously expressed that view.
At the same time, the share of Republicans who see immigration as an imminent threat has risen sharply, while support for free trade has softened.
The shifts reflect an electorate that has become more populist, both feeding off of Trump's populism and influencing the broader party, said J. Miles Coleman, an analyst at the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics.
"It's hard to see the (party) going back to nominating Mitt Romney-type candidates," Coleman said. Romney, who lost in 2012 to Democrat Barack Obama, at the end of this year will retire from the U.S. Senate, joining an exodus of old-line Republicans.
LARGER TRENDS
While Trump has been a transformational figure within the Republican Party, the changes in its worldview were in motion before he entered politics, said Dave Hopkins, a Boston College political science professor.
"Trump's nomination and election reflected the discomfort that many traditionalist and nationalist Americans feel about a swiftly changing and complex society in which the values of well-educated progressives increasingly prevail," Hopkins said, referring to initiatives on diversity, transgender rights and climate change that many conservatives oppose.
"These larger historical and social trends predated Trump, and they will almost certainly endure after his political career is over."
Trump's swift defeat of his rivals for the Republican presidential nomination this year demonstrated his grip on his party's voters, but November's election rematch between Trump and Biden will test how broad his appeal is.
Trump lost the 2020 election by more than 7 million votes, a result he continues to falsely claim was the result of fraud. He has also ramped up verbal assaults on the justice system as he braces for four upcoming criminal trials.
SUPPORT FROM HISPANICS
While the modern Republican Party's re-orientation around populist issues might limit its appeal to college-educated suburban and urban voters, it appears to be attracting some new supporters, particularly among Hispanics, the fastest-growing segment of the U.S. electorate, the analysis shows.
Some 29% of Hispanics without a college degree now identify as Republican, up from 24% in 2016. Hispanic men have shifted to the party more than Hispanic women.
"If the Republican Party can continue to bolster its appeal among non-white voters without college degrees, it will be able to sustain its electoral strength in national elections," said Hopkins.
Black voters, meanwhile, continue to largely avoid the party, but more now identify as independent, suggesting that there is at least an opportunity for persuasion by Republican candidates.
A LASTING INFLUENCE
Half of white voters without college degrees now identify as Republican, up from about 40% in 2016. That's a notable shift given that Democrats' ties with labor unions have historically brought them significant support from white voters who did not graduate from college.
These voters are more likely to live in rural areas and to have experienced job losses in the manufacturing and retail sectors that have come as a result of global trade deals.
Many saw their sons and daughters join the military during the country's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some have witnessed the impact of a rise in opioid addiction in their communities.
Some 21% of Republicans told this month's Reuters/Ipsos poll that military force should be used frequently to promote U.S. foreign policy, down from 35% in 2014.
Both political parties are more wary of war than they were a decade ago, with 44% of Republicans and 57% of Democrats now saying the U.S. should rarely or never use military force, up from 38% and 50% in 2014, respectively.
The party's embrace of free trade has also wobbled, with 72% of Republicans this month agreeing that international trade helps the average American, down from 78% in 2016. Republicans without a college degree had even lower support - 69%.
The share of Republicans who now view illegal immigration as an imminent threat has jumped to 57% from 40% in 2015. Republican support for border fencing and deportations has also jumped.
The poll also showed greater distrust of the electoral process, with only 52% of Republicans now voicing confidence in election results being accurate, compared to 66% in 2016.
About four in 10 Republicans see the Democratic Party as an imminent threat to the United States, up from one in four in 2015.
A similar proportion of Democrats view Republicans as a threat.
The analysis found a moderation of some hardline views on abortion, following the 2022 Supreme Court decision that ended the nationwide right to abortion.
The share of Republicans who say abortion should always be illegal has dropped to 14% in 2024 from 21% in 2016 as abortion rights have become a rallying cause for Democrats and independents.
"Perhaps some Republicans have realized that it's now an issue that works against them and are trimming their sails," Coleman said.
The Rise of Donald Trump Right-Wing Populism in the United States: Middle American Radicalism and Anti-Immigration Discours
The populist worldview divides society into two separated groups—the people and the elite—arguing that politics should be the expression of the general will of the people, but this “thin ideology” needs another guiding ideology—normally some forms of nationalism on the right and some forms of socialism on the left.” In absence of a strong ideological narrative capable to mobilize the masses (as conservatism, liberalism and socialism have been), the success of populism is largely based on the communication style of the leaders. In his book on American populism, The Populist Persuasion, the historian Michael Kazin describes populism as “a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class; view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic; and seek to mobilise the former against the latter."
The complex relationship between populism and democracy is at the core of the debate in the field. Greatly simplifying the theoretical frame, we can say that scholars are divided between those who argue that populism, as a form of authoritarianism, is a threat to (undermines) democracy and those who see it as a promise of democratic renewal, bringing new actors and policies into the political system. The first approach has been developed by Gino Germani [6], who studied Peronism in Argentina, by Torcuato Di Tella, who analyzed Latin American authoritarian populisms, and, more recently, by Ludolfo Paramio, Sussane Gratius, Flavia Freidenberg, and Roger Bartra. Among the European scholars, we can mention Ruth Wodak, who studied the discourses and practices of national populists as the Austrian FPO, and Nadia Urbinati who argues that populist governments, even if elected in democratic frames, represent a disfigured democracy.
Exploring the historical experiences, most scholars following the first approach focus on the indispensable and, to a certain extent, Machiavellian presence of a charismatic leader who bases his political aspirations on speaking on behalf of the people and characterizing the opposition as “the elite” and “the others”. Carlos Moscoso considers populism as an ideology projected in the leader’s discourse that appears as an easy way to solve economic and representation problems. In most populist experiences, the economic measures- protectionist and redistributive policies-, aren’t cautiously planned and cannot achieve a viable economic and social balance.
The second approach considers populism as part of democracy and argues that it might play a democratizing role in different contexts, while not ruling out the possibility of authoritarian versions. The role of populism in giving some form of representation to popular classes is recognized by Torcuato Di Tella, who is, by the way, extremely critical in front of Latin American populism, described as the consequence of continent social tensions: “The paradox of populism is that due to its authoritarian and occasionally violent traits it has been for decades a foe for liberal democracy; but it has held in his hands one essential component of any modern democratic regime the representation of the popular classes.”
According to Laclau and Mouffe, populism may even represent an option of radical democracy when the “many”, opposing against the “few”, redefine the political contest through a strategy at the borders of liberalism. In other terms, “the core elements of populism, putting the people in moral battle against elites, often benefit democracy by taking democratic politics back to its normative roots in the wants and needs of ordinary citizens and challenging, on egalitarian and justice grounds, elite political, economic, and cultural domination.”
Being both right-wing and left-wing, populism is an empty container that can be filled by extremely different narratives. The increasing electoral success of the European national populist right (French National Front- now Rassemblement National-, Austrian Freedom’s Party, Italian League, among others) over the past few decades is associated with the adoption of nationalist and anti-immigrants’ rhetoric. While it is central to national populist discourse, immigration does not occupy the same place in left-wing populist narratives: on the contrary, left-wing populists—Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, La France Insoumise in France—take political positions based on left traditional values of solidarity and internationalism. Furthermore, they are very critical of EU border security policy: “No migrant is illegal”, one of Syriza’s slogan, would be widely shared among the parties mentioned.
https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/12/6/154
What Is a Populist? And is Donald Trump one?
Why does Donald Trump exaggerate the size of his inauguration crowd, brag about his election win in conversations with world leaders, and claim without evidence that voter fraud may have cost him the popular vote? Why does he dismiss protesters who oppose him as “paid professionals” and polls that reflect poorly on him as “fake news”? Why does he call much of the media the “enemy of the people”?
There are explanations for these things that focus on the individual, characterizing Trump as a self-centered reality-TV star obsessed with approval and allergic to criticism.
But there is also an ideological explanation, and it involves a concept that gets mentioned a lot these days without much context or elaboration: populism.
What is a populist?
No definition of populism will fully describe all populists. That’s because populism is a “thin ideology” in that it “only speaks to a very small part of a political agenda,” according to Cas Mudde, a professor at the University of Georgia and a co-author of Populism: A Very Short Introduction. An ideology like fascism involves a holistic view of how politics, the economy, and society as a whole should be ordered. Populism doesn’t; it calls for kicking out the political establishment, but it doesn’t specify what should replace it. So it’s usually paired with “thicker” left- or right-wing ideologies like socialism or nationalism.
Populists are dividers, not uniters, Mudde told me. They split society into “two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the pure people on the one end and the corrupt elite on the other,” and say they’re guided by the “will of the people.” The United States is what political scientists call a “liberal democracy,” a system “based on pluralism—on the idea that you have different groups with different interests and values, which are all legitimate,” Mudde explained. Populists, in contrast, are not pluralist. They consider just one group—whatever they mean by “the people”—legitimate.
This conception of legitimacy stems from the fact that populists view their mission as “essentially moral,” Mudde noted. The “distinction between the elite and the people is not based on how much money you have or even what kind of position you have. It’s based on your values.”
Given their moral framing, populists conclude that they alone represent “the people.” They may not win 100 percent of the vote, but they lay claim to 100 percent of the support of good, hardworking folks who have been exploited by the establishment. They don’t assert that the neglected people who back them should be kept in mind by political leaders just like all other citizens; they claim that these neglected people are the only people that matter.
“Populists only lose if ‘the silent majority’—shorthand for ‘the real people’—has not had a chance to speak, or worse, has been prevented from expressing itself,” explains Jan-Werner Müller, a professor at Princeton University and the author of What Is Populism? “Hence the frequent invocation of conspiracy theories by populists: something going on behind the scenes has to account for the fact that corrupt elites are still keeping the people down. … If the people’s politician doesn’t win, there must be something wrong with the system.”
One might expect this argument to fail once populists enter government and become the establishment. But no: Populists—ranging from the revolutionary socialist Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to the religious conservative Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey—have managed to portray themselves as victims even at the height of their power, blaming their shortcomings on sabotage by shadowy domestic or foreign elites.
The notion of one virtuous people and one vile elite is a fiction, even if it does reflect real divisions and power dynamics in a given society. “There is no single political will, let alone a single political opinion, in a modern, complex, pluralist—in short, enormously messy—democracy,” writes Müller. It’s not that populists have some special mind meld with the masses. Rather, “populists put words into the mouth of what is after all their own creation.” As an example, Müller cites Nigel Farage, the former leader of the populist U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), who called Britain’s vote to leave the European Union a “victory for real people,” as if the 48 percent of British people who voted to remain in the EU were “somehow less than real—or, rather, questioning their status as members of the political community.”
Populists “tend to define the people as those that are with them,” Mudde said. The mark of a populist isn’t which specific groups of people he or she includes in “the people” or “the establishment.” It’s the fact that he or she is separating the world into those warring camps in the first place.
Stylistically, populists often use short, simple slogans and direct language, and engage in “boorish behavior, which makes [them] appear like the real people,” said Pippa Norris, a professor at Harvard University who is working on a book on the rise of “populist-authoritarian” politicians around the world, especially in Europe. They are typically “transgressive on all the rules of the game.”
Is Donald Trump a populist?
Something fundamental in Trump’s approach to politics changed around the time that Steve Bannon, now the president’s chief strategist in the White House, joined the businessman’s campaign, according to Mudde. Trump had been condemning America’s allegedly incompetent political leaders for decades. But when Trump launched his presidential bid, he was not, in Mudde’s mind, a populist. Over time, however, he’s come to style himself as one, in ways that help illuminate why Trump does what he does and says what he says.
Trump’s initial political vocabulary included the corrupt elite but not the pure people. Instead, in rambling speeches, he focused on just one person: himself...
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/
After Trump, Is American Democracy Doomed by Populism?
President Donald J. Trump is an authoritarian populist. And one of the key characteristics of populism lies in a leader’s belief that they, and they alone, truly represent the people.
That explains why Trump has kept clashing with democratic institutions over the course of his presidency. Whenever he ran up against the limits of his constitutional authority, he balked at the idea that somebody else—a judge, a bureaucrat, or a member of Congress—could tell him what to do. In his mind, only he had the right to speak for the country.
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/after-trump-american-democracy-doomed-populism
In J.D. Vance, Trump is going all in on populism — and elevating an heir apparent
Donald Trump had lined up safer choices. Instead, he picked a flamethrower as a running mate.
In J.D. Vance, Trump selected the most ideological, pugilistic Republican on his shortlist for vice president — someone who could help him attract blue-collar and Rust Belt voters, but whose comments on abortion could alienate some moderate suburbanites and women.
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/07/15/trump-jd-vance-heir-populism-00168539
JD Vance’s ‘populism’ comes with some Trump-written fine print
On the first night of the Republican National Convention, the party focused on “Making America Wealthy Again,” despite the fact that the United States has the strongest economy on the planet and is currently “the envy of the world.” On the second night, Republicans emphasized a “law and order” message, despite the fact that the party has nominated a criminal to lead its presidential ticket.
On the third night of the gathering in Milwaukee, the Republicans’ vice presidential nominee tried to sell voters on the idea that the party is prepared to shift its focus away from the wealthy elite as Donald Trump pitches tax breaks for billionaires at his glorified country club.
Perhaps the “Make America Great Again” theme should be replaced with “Impose Cognitive Dissonance on America Again.”
Voters unfamiliar with Sen. JD Vance might’ve tuned in to his convention speech, if for no other reason than to see and hear what the Ohio Republican had to say as he introduced himself to a national audience. His remarks were notable for a variety of reasons, though it was his economic vision that stood out. From the transcript of his remarks:
“Wall Street barons crashed the economy and American builders went out of business. ... President Trump’s vision is so simple and yet so powerful. We’re done, ladies and gentlemen, catering to Wall Street. We’ll commit to the working man.”
The senator added soon after that he sees Trump as “America’s last best hope” for the nation’s working class. Vance went on to say, “We need a leader who’s not in the pocket of big business.”
For viewers who didn’t know better, Vance’s rhetoric might very well have sounded like a refreshing break from party orthodoxy. It’s not exactly a secret that the Republican Party has championed the interests of the wealthy and corporate America for generations, so Vance’s version of “populism” appeared to represent an important shift.
There was, however, a rather dramatic problem hanging overhead: Trump’s record and future plans.
How JD Vance is an example of how people in the GOP will do anything to get
close to power
Indeed, literally one day before Vance boasted about Republicans no longer
“catering to Wall Street,” the GOP’s presumptive presidential nominee
boasted about his eagerness to slash the corporate tax rate in a prospective
second term.
The same day, The New York Times published a striking report on the degree to which Trump’s plans for trade tariffs would “widen the gap between the rich and the poor” and hit “lower-income households” the hardest.
This is the same Trump who not only rewarded the wealthy and big businesses with massive tax giveaways in his first term, but who also supports undoing Wall Street safeguards — which helps explain why billionaires are rallying behind his candidacy.
As for Vance’s idea that the United States needs "a leader who’s not in the pocket of big business,” the Washington Post recently reported on the former president recently huddling with Big Oil leaders at Mar-a-Lago. If the account is accurate, the Republicans’ presumptive presidential nominee told the oil industry executives that they should raise $1 billion to return him to the White House — and if they did, he’d reward them by eliminating environmental safeguards and approving new tax breaks.
The “deal” that Trump described, the Post added, “stunned several of the executives in the room.”
Soon after, three oil executives organized an event for Trump — attendees paid $250,000 per person to be there — where the Republican assured his wealthy supporters that he’d do everything the oil industry wants, including lifting the natural gas export ban, scraping existing energy safeguards and opening up more federal lands to oil drilling.
After Vance exited the convention stage, I was left with one question: Does he have any idea what his new boss intends to do after the election?
How Donald Trump’s populist narrative led directly to the assault on the US
Capitol
https://theconversation.com/how-donald-trumps-populist-narrative-led-directly-to-the-assault-on-the-us-capitol-153277
