Democracies Have an Advantage Over
Nondemocracies
Democratic States Tend to “do better” than
other Types of States in Great-power Rivalries
- Generating Long-term Economic Growth,
- Borrowing Capital,
- Building Alliances,
- Making International Agreements,
- Sustaining Stable & Legitimate Rule.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/.../return-great-power-rivalry
Soft Power - Culture & Foreign Policies are Attractive to Others
The united states of America has been the most powerful country in the world
for
the past seventy-five years, but will Washington’s reign as the
world’s leading superpower continue? At the end of World War II, the United
States and its victorious allies built the world we know today. American
military supremacy deterred great power war and undergirded international
peace and security. The
U.S. economy was a consistent source
of
technological innovation, an engine for global growth, and a model for how
other countries structure their domestic
markets and politics.
Democratic forms of governments, inspired by the United States, spread around the world, and by the late 2000s, more people were living under freedom than at any time in world history. U.S. diplomats led the way in erecting the international institutions that govern contemporary global politics, including the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the World Trade Organization.
And U.S. culture permeated the globe from blue jeans, Hollywood, and Coca-Cola during the Cold War, to hip-hop, the National Basketball Association, and Instagram today. These cultural contributions provided the United States with a significant reservoir of “soft power” and made planet Earth a richer and more vibrant home.
From the introduction of;
The Return of Great Power Rivalry
Smart political leaders have long understood that values can create power. If I can attract you and persuade you to want what I want, then I do not have to force you or pay you to do what I want. If the United States (or any country) represents values that others find attractive, it can economize on sticks and carrots. US soft power rests partly on American culture and foreign policies when they are attractive to others; but it also rests on our values and how we practice democracy at home.
As international polls show, President Donald Trump's term in office was not kind to American soft power. This was partly a reaction to Trump's nativist foreign policy, which shunned allies and multilateral institutions, as well as to his administration's incompetent response to the COVID-19 pandemic. But even more damaging to US soft power was Trump's effort to disrupt the orderly transition of political power after he lost the 2020 election. And on January 6, 2021, as Republican Senator Ben Sasse described the invasion of the US Capitol, "the world’s greatest symbol of self-government was ransacked while the leader of the free world cowered behind his keyboard tweeting against his Vice President for fulfilling the duties of his oath to the Constitution."
America's allies and other countries were shocked, and America's attractiveness was diminished. Can US soft power recover?
It would not be the first time. The US has serious problems, but it also has a capacity for resilience and reform that has rescued it in the past....
American Democracy and Soft Power https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/american-democracy-and-soft-power
With the news dominated by dramatic examples of countries using coercion, intimidation, and payoffs to advance their interests, the power of attraction would seem to be irrelevant in international relations. But it still matters, and governments ignore its potential at their peril.
As 2021 drew to a close, Russia had massed troops near its border with Ukraine; China had flown military jets near Taiwan; North Korea was still pursuing its nuclear-weapons program; and Taliban fighters were patrolling the streets of Kabul. Seeing all this, friends asked me: "Whatever happened to soft power?"
One answer is that it can be found in other recent events, such as President Joe Biden's virtual Summit for Democracy, which was attended by representatives from more than 100 countries. Having been excluded, China took to the airwaves and social media to proclaim that it had a different and more stable type of democracy than the one being extolled by the United States. What we were seeing was a great-power competition over soft power, understood as the ability to influence others by attraction rather than by coercion or payment.
Whatever Happened to Soft Power?
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whatever-happened-soft-power
With the rise of China and with the U.S. government’s formal recognition of
the return of great power competition -
research
to argue that;
Democratic Political Institutions Give States Economic, Diplomatic & Military Advantages Over Autocracies in Great Power Competition.;
Kroenig goes beyond the normative appeal for democracy in advancing
freedom, human rights and dignity, and the rule law
("
The -
The Inclusive Nature of Democratic Political Institutions, Kroenig argues;
- Facilitates the development of economic institutions that foster innovation and a superior ability to borrow in international capital markets, which contribute to long-term economic growth.
- Those institutions also, bind leaders in ways that allow leaders to send more credible signals and make them more reliable and hence more attractive alliance partners.
Democracies’ higher rates of economic growth enhance their military power and potential, but usually not to the point that they threaten others. Whereas “states balance against autocracies… they often bandwagon with powerful democracies” (216). In addition, evidence that democratic leaders face greater political costs from defeat in war than do autocratic leaders incentivizes them to be more careful in getting into wars. This, along with their superior economic and military power, results in democracies being more likely to win the wars that they fight.
Kroenig acknowledges that autocracies have some advantages, but argues that those advantages are outweighed by their many disadvantages. Their “extractive” institutions reduce innovation and discourage foreign capital, which limits economic growth. In addition, autocracies’ greater restrictions on the free flow of information increases the likelihood of their making big mistakes on issues of war and peace.
After making a strong theoretical case for the advantages of democracies in their long-term competitions with autocratic rivals, Kroenig turns to an empirical investigation of his theoretical arguments. He provides some statistical evidence, mainly for the last two centuries (chap. 3), but focuses primarily on historical case studies of great power rivalries between democracies and autocracies, from ancient Greece and Rome through the Cold War (part II). Kroenig provides a brief but useful discussion of the criteria by which he selects his cases and explains why he omits certain plausible cases (58-60). He then turns to;
- Athens - against Persia and Sparta
- Roman Republic - versus Carthage & Macedon
- Venetian Republic - against Byzantine Empire & Duchy of Milan
- Dutch Republic - versus the Spanish Empire
- Great Britain - versus France
- United Kingdom - versus Germany
- United States - and the Soviet Union
H-Diplo Roundtable XXII-45 on Kroenig. The Return of Great Power
Rivalry
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/7833227/h-diplo-roundtable-xxii-45-kroenig%C2%A0-return-great-power-rivalry
Matthew Kroenig – The Return of Great Power Rivalry
American exceptionalism was never simply about the culture of the American
people. It places a fundamental focus on American institutions and a faith in
the American political process. Indeed, Tocqueville recognized in the
nineteenth century
the importance of the political system
in
shaping a peculiar and unique
American culture.
It is not culture which defines institutions nor institutions which define culture. They are interrelated. And symbiotic. They reinforce one another in ways which drive the political and historical narrative beyond the decisions of individual leaders.
Rome and Athens both believed not just in the character of their people but the soundness of their political institutions to foster and reinforce their culture. Both Rome and Athens were the precursors to their own unique versions of exceptionalism. The long process of modernization in Europe abandoned this faith in institutions largely because modernization was a period of creative destruction where the institutions of the Ancien Régime were abandoned. English exceptionalism was only possible once it emerged from a bloody civil war which eventually gave birth to liberalism, not just as a political theory, but the institutions which made it possible.
Mathew Kroenig argues great power rivalries are shaped through the internal institutional frameworks of their political systems. He offers seven historical examples to provide context for the great power rivalry of the current era. Ultimately, the institutions of liberal democracies offer inherent advantages which shape the outcomes of these rivalries. It is easy to dismiss his larger point because many of his examples were neither liberal nor democracies. But this misses the point. Each example had institutions which fostered democratic values of openness and cooperation in contrast to autocratic governments which restrict the political debate and limit the contributions of their people.
A key concept within this book is the democratic advantage. This contrasts with an imagined autocratic advantage. The democratic advantage leverages economic potential, diplomatic relationships and raw military might to challenge autocratic intentions. It is lazy to simply say democracies encourage innovation and economic development. Rather its institutions encourage contributions from a larger range of its population. In contrast, autocratic government actively works to constrain and limit the contributions of its citizenry. Consequently, democracies foster greater innovation and a more dynamic economy which translates into hard power over time.
Sometimes Kroenig is a bit too loose in his definition of democracy. Athens is often described as the first democracy, but it was not democratic in the modern sense. Its concept of citizenship was limited. Slaves, women and immigrants lacked political power. But it was fundamentally more democratic than other governments. Rome was not so much democratic as it was aristocratic. Even the Netherlands centralized its power within the House of Orange. But their institutions were constructed to incorporate a broader range of perspective and encourage contributions from a wider range of population than many of their neighbors.
Moreover, Kroenig’s ideas have limited explanatory power. He does not offer an account for the emergence of autocratic great powers. Nor does he give a theoretical construct for the geopolitical decline of democracies. These issues are resolved through a focus on the institutions rather than the totality of the political system. For example, the economic growth of China was the result of liberalizing reforms which expanded the opportunity for people to make important economic contributions. But Kroenig essentially argues China will face limitations to its economic potential without further reforms which continue to empower its people.
Kroenig offers an entertaining read which challenges the assumptions of international relations. It lacks the breadth or intensity of Sheri Berman’s recent masterpiece Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe. Where Berman spent ten years of research to develop her ideas, Kroenig seems to rely on his own natural sense of history. But it feels as though Kroenig does not believe he has offered the final word on this subject. Rather, he has simply made the opening gambit. He wants to challenge the pessimism of the era. There is a fundamental optimism within his work. And it is his optimism which makes the work refreshing and a pleasure to read.
https://democracyparadox.com/2020/01/18/matthew-kroenig-the-return-of-the-great-power-rivalry/
(chapter summaries)
ABSTRACT
The United States of America has been the most powerful country in the world for the past seventy years, but will Washington’s reign as the world’s leading superpower continue? The U.S. National Security Strategy declares that the return of great power competition with Russia and China is the greatest threat to U.S. national security and economic well-being. Perhaps surprisingly, international relations scholarship does not have much to say about who wins great power rivalries, and many contemporary analysts argue that America’s autocratic rivals will succeed in disrupting or displacing U.S. global leadership. In sharp contrast, this book makes the novel argument that democracies enjoy built-in advantages in international geopolitics. Drawing on the writings of political philosophers—such as Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu—and cutting-edge social science research, this book explains the unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages that democracies bring to the international arena. It then carefully considers the advantages and disadvantages possessed by autocratic great powers. These ideas are then examined in a series of seven case studies of democratic-versus-autocratic rivalries throughout history, from ancient Greece to the Cold War. The book then unpacks the implications of this analysis for the United States, Russia, and China today. It concludes that, despite its many problems, America’s fundamentals are still much better than Russia’s and China’s. By making the “hard-power” argument for democracy, this book provides an innovative way of thinking about power in international politics and provides an optimistic assessment about the future of American global leadership.
Part I Democracy versus Autocracy
Chapter 1 - The Democratic Advantage in Theory
This chapter puts forth the argument that democracies enjoy built-in advantages in long-run geopolitical competitions. It begins by defining key terms, such as “democracy” and “autocracy.” Then, drawing on the writing of political philosophers, such as Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu, and contemporary social science research, this chapter explains the unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages that democracies bring to the international arena. These advantages include: higher long-run rates of economic growth, access to international capital, larger and more reliable alliances, and a tendency to win international wars. It then explains how these advantages grant democracies an edge in amassing wealth and power, becoming great powers, and achieving global hegemony at rates greater than their autocratic rivals.
Chapter 2 - The Autocratic Advantage?
This chapter explores the idea of an autocratic advantage in international politics. Throughout the ages, scholars, including Alexis de Tocqueville, have argued that autocracies have an advantage in international politics. These arguments are resurfacing today as Russia and China vie for global leadership. According to the autocratic advantage idea, autocracies can set a long-term plan and stick to it. They can take bold action. They can be ruthless when necessary. And their domestic politics are marked by stability. In contrast, democracies are preoccupied by two-year election cycles, stymied in endless debate, and unduly constrained by morality and law. And their politics are marked by messy political infighting. This chapter weighs these ideas, and concludes that many of these so-called autocratic advantages are not, in fact, unique to autocracies and others should more properly be considered handicaps rather than advantages.
Part II The Democratic Advantage in History
Chapter 3 - The Democratic Advantage by the Numbers
This chapter examines quantitative evidence for a link between a state’s domestic political institutions and its power in the international system. Using standard international relations datasets, it finds significant support for the democratic advantage idea. It is notable how often democracies appear at or near the top of global power rankings. And this is even more remarkable when one considers how historically rare this form of government has been. This chapter finds that, on average, democracies possess more power than autocracies. It reveals that they are more likely to find themselves among the major powers and at the very top of the global distribution of power. Finally, it also demonstrates that, when comparing democratic and autocratic competitors from a common baseline and watching their power trajectories unfold over time, the trend-lines favor democracies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research design for the case studies to follow.
Chapter 4 - Athens, Sparta, and Persia
This chapter considers the rise of Athens in the ancient world and its competitions against its rivals, Persia and Sparta. It argues that its democratic institutions were a key to its success. Athens was the world’s first democracy, and it rose to become the leader of the Greeks, with an empire that stretched from North Africa to Crimea. It was a major trading and naval power and forged a formidable alliance of Greek city-states to defeat the mighty Persian Empire. It then fought a legendary series of wars against its oligarchic rival for ascendancy in Greece, Sparta. In the end, Athens’s form of direct democracy and decision-making through tyranny of the majority was its undoing. But not before Athens reigned as a liberal leviathan for nearly a century and showcased an enduring model for how other open states could acquire international power and influence.
Chapter 5 - The Roman Republic, Carthage, and Macedon
This chapter considers Rome’s rise from a small kingdom on the Tiber River in Central Italy to dominating the entire Mediterranean and becoming one of the most powerful geopolitical forces in world history. Following scholars as diverse as Polybius, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu, it argues that the institutions of the Roman Republic were the key to its success. After its transition to republican governance in 509 BC, Rome succeeded in defeating neighboring tribes to control the entire Italian Peninsula and setting it up for rivalry with the other great republican powerhouse of the western Mediterranean: Carthage. Rome destroyed Carthage in a series of three Punic Wars. Finally, it dispensed with several autocratic kingdoms of the Hellenic world in the eastern Mediterranean, including Macedon. In just a few short centuries, Rome found itself transformed from a small city-state into a global superpower standing astride the entire civilized world.
Chapter 6 - The Venetian Republic, the Byzantine Empire, and the Duchy of Milan
This chapter examines the rise of the Venetian Republic and its victories over autocratic rivals. The Venetian Republic was one of the most open polities of the Middle Ages, and it found itself in strategic competitions with other rival powers, including the Byzantine Empire, Genoa, and the Duchy of Milan. Like other dominant democracies before and since, Venice became a major trading, financial, and naval power and it was renowned for its shrewd diplomacy. In the end, Venice bested its rivals, even sacking the imperial city of Constantinople in AD 1204. At the peak of its power, the Venetian Empire’s territorial control spanned from northern Italy, along the Dalmatian Coast, to much of Greece and Anatolia, including Constantinople, with significant influence in the Levant, North Africa, and the Black Sea. Our friend Machiavelli admired Venice as “excellent among modern republics.”
Chapter 7 - The Dutch Republic and the Spanish Empire
This chapter examines the Dutch Republic’s revolt and war of independence against the Spanish Empire. In the spate of less than a century, from 1581 to 1648, the Dutch Republic went from a tiny polity in northern Europe to a global empire that stretched from the Americas to Africa and Asia. It ruled the high seas, dominated international trade, invented the stock market, and revolutionized modern warfare, defeating the once-mighty Spanish Empire. Its secret to success was simple: it followed the recipe of the dominant democracies that had preceded it.
Chapter 8 - Great Britain and France
This chapter examines Great Britain’s rise to global ascendancy and its world-spanning rivalry with France. Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Britain adopted a more democratic form of government and this contributed to economic growth, including the industrial revolution, and diplomatic and military success. Its path to the top was not easy, however, as Britain confronted the challenge from autocratic France on the European continent. It fought major wars against Louis XIV and Napoleon, but emerged victorious in the end, setting the stage for Britain’s global empire and the Pax Britannica of the 19th century.
Chapter 9 - The United Kingdom and Germany
This chapter considers the United Kingdom’s rivalry with Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. After nearly two centuries of ascendancy, the UK was challenged by an autocratic Germany growing in the heart of Europe. The two clashed in World War I, and the United Kingdom emerged victorious and with its largest-ever territorial expanse, expanding its empire into the Middle East. World War II took a harder toll on the UK, but, again, with the help of its navy, its financial power, and its democratic allies—and in no small part to the heedless decision-making of its autocratic rival—it once again prevailed.
Chapter 10 - The United States and the Soviet Union
Otto von Bismarck famously said that “God has special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Divine providence may not have hurt, but it was America’s domestic political institutions that transformed a smattering of British colonies in North America into, first, an independent nation and, then, a global superpower with a network of allies and partners spanning six continents. The United States faced off against the Soviet Union for a half century during the Cold War. But Washington possessed the better institutions, and the stress of the competition caused Moscow’s political system to collapse altogether. In the post–Cold War period that followed, Washington deepened and expanded the Pax Americana, and spread unprecedented levels of global peace, prosperity, and freedom. For the first time since Ancient Rome, a single superpower so overawed any potential competitors that great power rivalry itself came to a temporary halt.
Part III The Democratic Advantage Today
Chapter 11 - The Russian Federation
This chapter analyzes the Russian Federation through the lens of its domestic political system. Russia may pose the greatest near-term national security threat to the United States and its allies, but it has a key vulnerability: its domestic political institutions. Its autocratic system is undermining its international effectiveness. Its economy is smaller than Italy’s. It lacks effective alliances. And its military is overly focused on domestic threats and is ill-equipped for the strategic-technological competitions of the 21st century. It is dangerous and it can disrupt the U.S.-led order. But it will not be in a position to be a true peer competitor to the United States any time soon. So long as it continues to be ruled by President Vladimir Putin, or another similar dictator, Russia will not be able to mount a serious challenge to U.S. global leadership.
Chapter 12 - The People’s Republic of China
This chapter analyzes the rise of China and the threat it poses to the United States and its allies. Some argue that we must begin to come to grips with what life will be like “when China rules the world.” Others maintain that the rise of China and decline of the United States could result in World War III. Fortunately, these predictions are much too dire. This chapter argues that a China led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is unlikely become the world’s leading state. Its autocratic model is not well suited to building a world-beating, innovation economy, to winning friends and allies around the world; or to constructing a lethal military force with global power-projection capabilities. China has a storied past, and it will likely always remain a great power, but it is unlikely to overtake the United States as the world’s leading state any time soon.
Chapter 13 - The United States of America
This chapter examines the future of American global leadership through the lens of its domestic political institutions. It finds that the United States faces growing troubles at home. At the same time, its vibrant economy, strong alliances relationships, and its unmatched military, all reflections of the U.S. domestic political system, will continue to provide a significant source of strategic advantage for the United States over its autocratic competitors in the years to come. The international security environment is becoming more competitive, and the United States does not exercise the unchallenged primacy it enjoyed in the 1990s. We have returned to an era of great power rivalry. But, there is no doubt that the United States remains the world’s leading power.
Part IV The Democratic Advantage in the Future
Chapter 14 - Implications for American Leadership
This chapter reviews the central arguments of the book and its findings about a democratic advantage in international politics. It then discusses the implications for international relations theory and for U.S. foreign policy. This book advances international relations theory by providing a novel theoretical explanation that traces the origins of power in world politics to domestic political institutions. It makes a “hard power” case for democracy. The chapter then lays out a competitive strategy for the United States in this new era of great power rivalry. It urges the United States to strengthen its democratic form of governance domestically. Washington should also ensure it maintains an innovative economy, a robust financial sector, strong alliances, and a favorable military balance of power in Europe and Asia. Internationally, the chapter urges the United States to revitalize, adapt, and defend the rules-based international system. The chapter concludes with a challenge to Russia and China. If these countries wish to be true leading global powers, then they must adopt democratic forms of government.
June 24: A Book Talk on The Return of Great Power Rivalry with Dr. Matthew Kroenig
On June 24, Dr. Matthew Kroenig, the director of the Global Strategy Initiative and deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, joined GTI Executive Director Russell Hsiao of the Global Taiwan Institute on June 24 for a talk on his recent book, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China. In his book, he argues that democracies are uniquely prepared to overcome any challenge autocratic rivals pose, despite growing concerns. In aggregate, Kroenig contends, democracies outcompete autocracies.
When asked about the main advantages and disadvantages of democracies and their correlation with the balance of power, Kroenig discussed several case studies of competition throughout history that he used to test his theory in the book. He found that in most cases, democracies experience sustained growth, innovation, and ultimately tend to be the “center” of international finance. Regarding military affairs, democracies often have greater flexibility and make more rational decisions due to input from multiple parties. Conversely, autocracies often have to spend more on internal security compared to external.
Subsequently, Hsiao asked what similarities and differences exist between the current US competition with China and its struggles with past rivals. Kroenig argued that the most critical difference is that China has nuclear weapons, which act as a significant deterrent. Additionally, increased globalization and interdependence have inflated the costs of taking aggressive action. The most common similarity that Kroenig pointed out is that China tends to focus more on regime security instead of prioritizing development, much like past autocratic regimes. Second, rules of politics and political behavior have not changed; despite some differences, the current US-China competition has much in common with historical rivalries.
Another topic centered around Russia and its “partnership” with China, specifically the notion that the US should seek to balance China with Russia. Kroenig believes that it would be a mistake to put too much weight into this argument. First, it is unlikely that Russia and China could form a deep and trusting relationship that poses a threat to US interests. Second, autocracies historically do not make good allies and rarely work well together. Third, regarding working with Russia, the US and other democracies have little reason to trust Putin’s word.
Hsiao then asked about the role of ideology in great power competition. Kroenig responded by mentioning that both Putin and Xi fear the spread of democracy, and are leveraging technological capabilities to facilitate authoritarianism worldwide. To combat it, the US should frame the issue as an ideological struggle to make it easier for states to “choose a side.”
The two then discussed the possibility of creating a new “league of democracies” to promote and strengthen relations between democracies. Kroenig mentioned that, despite the negative connotation of democracy promotion since the Iraq War, it has consistently been at the core of US grand strategy since 1945. Hsiao then asked if it would be possible to create a NATO-like structure in Asia. Kroenig explained that in an ideal world, creating a “D10″—a coalition of the world’s 10 largest democracies—could help facilitate diplomatic and economic discussions.
Hsiao asked whether the US was in a “new Cold War” and Korenig emphasized that if a “Cold War” means a serious competition, then yes. If it means that we are approaching a high likelihood of war, then no. Compared to the Cold War and the current era, the US will need to create new strategies and policies instead of following the old guidelines like “containment.”
Following this, Hsiao questioned the role of non-democratic states in the Indo-Pacific, especially those unwilling to “choose a side.” Kroenig pointed out that many such states in the region have contributed greatly to the US-led rules-based international system. As such, the US wants states like Singapore to play a part in great power competition regardless of their “democratic” affiliation. On a similar note, the two discussed the role of smaller democracies such as Taiwan in great power competition. Kroenig shared his confidence in Taiwan’s long-term prospects compared those of the PRC, but also mentioned that the US needs to remain committed to Taiwan’s security. By leveraging its relationship with Taiwan and other democracies, the US will stand a better chance against China.
In Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s recent speech at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit 2020, she has emphasized the importance of economic cooperation between democracies. Both Hsiao and Kroenig agreed that this element of “competition” is crucial, since China’s primary strength is its economic power, largely due to its unfair trading practices and tendency to prey on the system. According to Kroenig, major powers and small democracies alike should work to strengthen common standards for technology and limit over-investment in sensitive areas.
Hsiao then asked about the importance of trust in ideological competition. Kroenig responded by mentioning that historically, democracies have always been viewed as trustworthy partners. Credible commitments matter, especially for the United States. Democracies are generally more likely to comply with agreements and are usually constrained by their domestic population from making rash decisions. He used the example of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was followed by all the democratic countries who signed on, while multiple autocratic states have broken their commitments.
With the final question before the Q&A section, Hsiao pondered on the role of the US alliance system in Kroenig’s thesis of great power competition. Kroenig argues that our alliance system is reflective of our domestic institutions. The US builds its networks to be effective and should use them to outmatch China in the long run. Historically, states need allies to balance efficiently. China is attempting to woo its neighbors using the BRI, but its effectiveness is questionable. Currently, the US is bickering too much with its partners and must work effectively, according to Kroenig.
To conclude the discussion, Hsiao asked how the US and Taiwan should cooperate going forward. Kroenig responded by arguing that military and defense conversations should come first. Although the US and Taiwan do not have an official alliance, their security ties are highly coordinated. Kroenig mentioned that the US should clarify our commitment to Taiwan to limit miscalculation.
This summary was written by GTI Summer 2020 Intern Joseph Ross.
Does Great-Power Competition Favor Autocracies?
“What if we could just be China for a day?” New York Times opinion columnist Thomas Friedman openly pondered in 2010, amidst partisan gridlock in Washington. Since then, pessimism around the ability of America’s democracy to meet authoritarian challenges has only grown. From Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, it often seems that authoritarian governments are running circles around the world’s divided and dysfunctional democracies. “Who wants to join the posse,” AEI’s Hal Brands argues, “if the sheriff can’t shoot straight?” With America entering a new era of great-power competition with China and Russia, many observers fear that authoritarianism will provide these rivals a potentially decisive advantage.
Matthew Kroenig’s timely new book, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Authoritarianism from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China, seeks to push back against this narrative of autocratic ascendance and make the “hard-power case for democracy.” Kroenig, a professor at Georgetown University and deputy director of the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council, methodically dissects the reported advantages of autocratic regimes and offers the case for democracy as a “force multiplier that helps states punch above their weight in the international system.”
Kroenig argues that while authoritarian regimes can take decisive actions on the world stage, ruthlessly pursue advantages, and compel their populations to super-human economic achievements (for a while, at least), democracies have historically gotten the upper hand in geopolitical struggles. “It is hard to argue with an undefeated record of four centuries and counting,” Kroenig boasts.
Using accessible quantitative methods and seven short historical case studies, the book lays out how democratic systems have bested authoritarian challenges through a broad swath of history. Kroenig concludes by addressing the current state of ideological and geopolitical competition between the United States and its authoritarian competitors, Russia and China.
Some of Kroenig’s most interesting and counter-intuitive examples emerge from the military sphere—an area where many lay observers might assume a clear autocratic advantage. Kroenig builds upon excellent works from the field of military effectiveness and democratic wartime advantage, such as Caitin Talmadge’s The Dictator’s Army and Allam Stam and Dan Reiter’s Democracies at War, to show a broader perspective on the performance of democracies in great-power competitions. Autocracies, Kroenig highlights, must “omnibalance” against both internal and external threats. This domestic security imperative has hamstrung even the most formidable authoritarian militaries. Oligarchic Sparta’s phalanxes, for example, remained incapable of campaigns exceeding forty days in duration to prevent revolts from the enslaved helot class, “an enemy” who Aristotle described as “constantly sitting in wait of the disaster of the Spartans.” Xi Jinping’s China, which spends more on domestic security than external security and faces serious internal challenges in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, mirrors this weakness.
Autocratic militaries are also crippled by mistrust and suspicion. Kroenig skillfully highlights how autocrats fear devolving power to junior subordinates and emphasize top-down command styles. While China has possessed submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons since 1986, Beijing resists deploying their Jin-Class boomers with their fully lethal cargo of twelve nuclear-tipped missiles, as “Beijing just does not trust its officers to go to sea with nuclear weapons.” This unwillingness to devolve responsibility directly degrades the ship’s intended purpose of deterrence. The lesson? For autocracies, regime security supersedes national security.
Nor are autocrats superior decisionmakers. The mechanisms that make democratic decision making so messy, he points out, are in fact the makings of designed checks-and-balances. While democracies have also made their share of hubristic mistakes—such as the Athens’ doomed Sicily expedition and the American War in Vietnam—democratic institutions enable course corrections that often elude autocracies. Kroenig echoes Machiavelli, who wrote in his Discourses on Livy that “fewer errors will be seen in the people than in the prince—and those lesser and having greater remedies.”
Kroenig assertively supports his thesis of democracy’s hard power advantage in great-power competition and briskly takes the reader through thousands of years of geopolitics to the modern day. However, the quick pace and triumphal tone of the book’s march through history, while perhaps necessary for public consumption, suggests an inevitability in democratic victory. If success in great-power competition depends only upon maintenance of democratic governance at home, then one naturally wonders, why should America expend its financial wealth and military strength abroad?
Kroenig proposes a continuation of the muscular internationalism that has characterized much of America’s post–Cold War grand strategy. “World War III is very much possible and the risks are growing,” he warns in the book’s closing pages. Kroenig, after all, is no dove. In 2012, shortly after leaving his position as a special advisor for Iran policy in the Pentagon’s policy office during the Obama administration, he wrote a bombshell article in Foreign Affairs entitled “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option.”
While Kroenig signed the 2016 “Never Trump” letter while serving as an advisor to Sen. Marco Rubio’s (R-Fla.) campaign, he subsequently regretted that decision, and later wrote in Foreign Affairs that “taking a step back reveals that Trump has gotten much of the big picture right” on foreign policy.
This duality is most apparent in the book’s closing sections. While Kroenig champions how democratic societies derive an economic benefit from the “brain drain” of immigrants fleeing authoritarian regimes, he remains silent on the potential impact of restrictive immigration policies, such as the Trump administration’s 2017 travel ban. Similarly, while Kroenig argues that democracies make better allies because they are trusted to uphold diplomatic agreements, he quickly dismisses the impact of recent moves such as leaving the Iran deal as mere “policy differences” with America’s allies.
Nevertheless, Kroenig’s work represents a much-needed lesson in the hard power advantage of democracies. Putting aside moral considerations, Americans should take confidence in the considerable advantages of democracy on the world stage. America’s geostrategic inheritance from seventy-five years of global leadership—deep alliance relationships, a central global financial position, vast soft power influence, a world-class and worldwide military—remains the envy of its rivals. While democracy is messy, hard, and often dysfunctional, Kroenig reminds Americans to take some comfort in their starting position for this new era of great-power rivalry.
Sam Wilkins is an active-duty U.S. Army Special Forces officer with deployments to Somalia, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. Sam is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and is currently a student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). These views are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, Johns Hopkins SAIS, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/does-great-power-competition-favor-autocracies-162568
Who Has the Right Stuff? Matthew Kroenig’s new book makes a strong,
grounded case that democracies have clear strategic advantages over their
autocratic rivals.
...This study is much needed and elegantly executed. Kroenig engages the
theoretical reasons why either democracy or autocracy might have the upper
hand in economic, diplomatic, and military assets. The former may be more
innovative, self-renewing, and dynamic while the latter may be more
concerted and disciplined.
He then turns to the historical record. His treatments of the face-offs between Athens and Sparta, Britain and France, Britain and a rising Wilhelmine Germany, and the United States and Soviet Union manage a freshness of insight to advance his contention that democracies have the upper hand. His fair and accessible treatments of three other cases of great power transitions—all of which represent far less frequently hoed soil—bolster his case too: 1) Rome, Carthage and Macedon; 2) the Venetian Republic, Byzantium and the Duchy of Milan, and 3) the Dutch Republic and Spanish Empire.
The heart of the book is an analysis in turn of the United States, Russia, and China as the great powers of today. Here as ever, one has to give Kroenig credit for guts. Six years ago, he braved the common wisdom of the professoriate and foreign policy community by publishing calls for the use of force rather than a multilateral accord to neutralize Iran’s nuclear arms capacity. Now, once again contrarian, he argues the United States does not face insuperable advantages from Russia’s and China’s centralized decision-making and their cunning use of modern technology for surveillance and disinformation. He argues that U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military advantages are both derived from its democratic system and will best the tools Moscow and Beijing possess. Like his equally iconoclastic Georgetown University colleague (a generation his senior), Robert Lieber, he offers the counterintuitive case that the United States is not in decline, or at least needn’t be.
However, on each count Kroenig addresses—America’s economic, diplomatic, and military strength—recent evidence suggests these assets might be more fragile than usual. Do inequality, deregulation, and cuts in taxes and revenues destine the United States for an economic crash like that of 90 years ago? Does the recent undervaluing or hollowing out of U.S. diplomatic capacity, public diplomacy organs, and—as Senator Chris Murphy has analyzed—non-military aid augur a distinctly lessened capacity to persuade foreign friends and foes of our word, our values, and our model? Unaccompanied by these “soft power” instruments, is U.S. military might too uni-dimensional an asset to counter the influence of Russia and especially China? After all, it hasn’t been enough to deter Russian incursions into Georgia and Ukraine, nor to deter Chinese moves to build outposts in the South China Sea, extinguish Hong Kong’s democratic autonomy, and commit atrocities against millions of Uighur Muslims.
Nonetheless, Kroenig makes the best case available for America’s ability to compete as a function of its open system. The most distinctive and convincing argument is that U.S. power lies not in being a solo artist, but as the leader of a band of fellow market democracies. As in a rich Atlantic Council report he co-authored, he suggests the point is not whether the United States can best Russia or China. It is rather how the United States, its NATO allies, India, Japan, South Korea and various other liberal partners taken together have far more potential than Russia and China. Russia and China’s smaller autocratic allies or friends of mere convenience pale by comparison in number and heft. The implication is that Washington has to better leverage this asset. Kroenig observes:
Some argue that U.S. alliances are fraying. They cite harsh criticisms of old friends coming out of the current administration…These tensions will continue, but they will also be manageable…[L]est we forget, Washington and its allies have made it through tough times in the past.
This is a useful reminder. Yet a recent U.S. failure to nurture partnerships with market democracies will have more lasting impact upon his own logic than Kroenig surmises.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2020/08/19/who-has-the-right-stuff/
Excerpt: A Few Pages From the Introduction
(marks on my copy of the book by me - pages 3 to 6)
